

THE EXPOSITORY TIMES.

Notes of Recent Exposition.

Who is the best interpreter of the Old Testament? The Jew claims the book as his, the Christian claims it as his, and each thinks that he holds in his own hands the key to it. To the Jew the Old Testament is the Bible, the whole Bible; to the Christian the Bible includes the later Testament towards which he believes the older book points, and in which he believes it finds its consummation. Who is to be umpire in this honourable rivalry?

If any man could conceivably have the right to decide such a question, that man would perhaps be Mr. C. G. MONTEFIORE. As a Jew, he understands the Old Testament thoroughly and from the inside, and he is conversant with the development within Judaism of Old Testament thought from the day when the Old Testament stood complete down to the present day. But more. He knows the New Testament; he is conversant with the development of Old Testament thought beyond and outside the domain of Judaism. Indeed, he knows the New Testament better than most Christians do. He has written on it not only with learning and insight, but with sympathy, and in such a way as to command not only the respect but the gratitude of Christian scholars.

But besides being a Jew, he has a mind of extraordinary fairness, and he exercises a discriminating judgment on that ancient literature which, taken as a whole, he passionately loves and which he has 'in divers portions and in divers manners' so

brilliantly expounded. How frank and critical of it he can be appears in phrase after phrase of an article contributed by him to the April number of *The Holborn Review*. 'The Old Testament is to me,' he says, 'as it is to Christian critics, imperfect.' In recognizing the different levels of Hebrew religious achievement, he can speak of the *best* God of the Old Testament. 'The Old Testament,' he admits, 'has many faults'—in particular he specifies 'its cruelty, its revengefulness, its imprecations.' Here is an almost bolder concession: 'Much can be said against Yahweh; if you look for blemishes, you can find them in plenty. He is jealous, He is partial, He is often all *too* human, and even human where man is not at his best.'

Here is a fine blend of the lover and the critic—a critic who has not suffered his devotion to blind him to the imperfections of the thing he loves. What, then, has he to say on the momentous question of the contribution of Israel to religion? That is to be found in the article to which we have referred. It is the substance of an address on 'The Achievement of the Old Testament' which he delivered, as President, on the last day of last year at the meeting of the Society for Old Testament Study.

There are words, he admits, in the New Testament which cannot possibly thrill the Jew as they thrill the Christian. Such a word is, 'Come unto me, all ye that are weary and heavy laden.' But

it is equally true, he believes, that there are words in the Old Testament which move the Jew as they cannot move the Christian. Among these words stands, first and foremost, this: 'Hear, O Israel, the Lord our God, the Lord is One. And thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thine heart, and with all thy soul, and with all thy might.' And there are other words whose appeal, to the Jew, is only a little less moving. Such are, 'In that day shall the Lord be One and His name One'; or 'Ye are My witnesses'; or 'Ye shall be unto Me a kingdom of priests and a holy nation'; or 'Know therefore this day, and lay it to thine heart that the Lord He is God in heaven above and upon the earth beneath; there is none else.' This point may be readily conceded, that for good historical reasons such words are, as he puts it, 'more dear and precious and sacred to the Jew than to the Christian.'

The supreme achievement of the Old Testament, according to Mr. MONTEFIORE, is that it contains all the essentials of religious Theism in a highly provocative form. Its God is as remote as could be from the realm of abstraction. The Old Testament has an almost overwhelming sense of the Personality of God. He is 'the God who rules and cares; the God who is just and pitiful and loving; the God to whom man can pray, and who enters into relations with man; the God who is creator; the God who rewards goodness and punishes wickedness; the God who helps and aids; the one and only God.'

It is much more difficult for the men of a later day, who are the heirs to centuries of metaphysical speculation, and who wrestle with the problems raised by ontology and ethics, to hold this conception of the Personality of God with the simplicity and conviction with which it is presented in the Old Testament. But it is just there that the Old Testament can render us an inestimable service. Written by men whose convictions sprang from their experience of life, it comes as a tonic to other men whose minds are jaded by philosophical discussion; and Mr. MONTEFIORE's words will find an echo in many a heart when, uttering his own con-

fession of faith, he says, 'Its very simplicity and fearlessness are a perpetual consolation, a constant stimulus, an abiding refreshment of soul.'

Another point he makes is that the Theism of the Old Testament is a virile and a human Theism. This is just another way of saying that the Personality of God is taken seriously. In one sense the God of the Old Testament is—if we may reverently say so—fashioned like a man, like a manly man, 'a mean between the two bad extremes of pitilessness and good-naturedness.' In another sense, of course, there is a great gulf fixed between God and man; and taking us into his confidence Mr. MONTEFIORE tells us that, while he likes the Old Testament's insistence on the gulf between God and man, he likes hardly less the insistence on the bridge or bridges between them. Man can pray, God can hear; they are not inevitably and irrevocably apart. Man can say to God, 'Thou art with me.' But the disciples of Barth and Otto will welcome the admission that 'the immensity of the difference between them is still more fundamental to Old Testament religion' than the kinship between them.

This is an illustration of the practical way in which the Old Testament, like life itself, reconciles theoretically unreconciled antinomies. Part of its charm lies in the generosity which finds a place for opposites, and which has no interest in forcing its truth into any Procrustean bed. Its God is both near and far; He is loving, but He is also just. Both types of statement are felt to be true, and the Old Testament allows them to lie quietly side by side; it feels under no obligation to attempt any theoretical reconciliation between them. This power of doing justice to seeming opposites appears in its recognition alike of man's free will and of his need of Divine grace. Here Mr. MONTEFIORE has some suggestive things to say.

He quotes with approval the words of Rousseau's Savoyard Vicar: 'If I do evil, I have no excuse; I do it because I will to do it; to ask him (*i.e.* God) to change my will is to ask him what he asks from me; it is to ask him that he should do my work,

and that I may receive the reward.' But he quotes with equal approval the words of a Jewish friend of his who said, 'In myself I am utterly rotten and feeble. Whatever goodness I may have done has been all the work of God.' Both these statements have their counterpart in the Old Testament. On the one hand it says, 'thou shalt' and 'thou shalt not,' and to its 'ought,' Mr. MONTEFIORE tells us he replies, not, 'I can't,' but 'I can': he feels ashamed when he has done wrong, just because he knows he could have done right, and his extenuations and explanations of sin are 'all stuff and nonsense.' On the other hand it says, 'Create in me a clean heart, O God,' and 'Teach me to do thy will.' Man is both able and unable; and 'if you like,' as the lecturer pleasantly says, 'to call the one a Jewish and Old Testament bit of reality, and the other a New Testament and Christian bit of reality, I am content, so long as it is conceded to me that both bits are valuable, and that neither bit is wholly false or expresses the full truth, the complete reality.'

These things, however, great as they are, do not exhaust the achievement of the Old Testament. Though Mr. MONTEFIORE'S spiritual affinities are decidedly with the prophet rather than the priest, he has an intense and reverent appreciation of the Law, that is, 'the Law as a whole'; to him it is the symbol of Law, and behind it is the majesty of God Himself. Like every good Jew he regards the Sabbath as vastly more than a 'grand social achievement, put under the ægis of religion'; it fills him with unspeakable joy, such as those who are alien to the commonwealth of Israel can only remotely understand.

But next to its vivid Theism, perhaps the supreme achievement of the Old Testament is its 'indissoluble intertwining of religion with morality.' Not only in the Prophets but in the Psalter and the Proverbs what God demands are justice, kindness, and humility. So intensely ethical is the Old Testament's conception that, as Mr. MONTEFIORE bluntly says, 'If we subtract God's moral qualities from Him, He simply collapses.' The God whom it invites us to worship is a God with a

character, as Sir George Adam Smith used to say.

Surely, then, a book which enshrines a religion so vital to human welfare as this address shows the Old Testament to be deserves from the religious public a respect and attention which in these days it all too seldom receives.

The more one reads the contributions made by Dr. N. P. WILLIAMS, the Lady Margaret Professor of Divinity at Oxford, to theological literature, the more one realizes that in him the Anglican Church possesses a scholar and thinker of eminent quality. In a book just published, *The Grace of God* (Longmans; 4s. net), he deals with some of the profoundest subjects of human thought. The essay is partly Biblical, partly historical, and (in its closing chapter) constructive and suggestive. The history of reflection on the relations of the Divine and the Human in salvation is pursued through the centuries, and we are shown the swing of minds between the conception of Grace as Power on the one hand, and what may be called Influence on the other. The one is Augustinian, and is characteristic of the 'twice-born,' the men of sudden conversion, leading to a stiff predestinarian creed. The other is Pelagian, characteristic of the 'once-born,' the moralists who refuse any faith in 'irresistible' grace. For this review the reader is referred to the book. We are at present concerned with the chapters on the New Testament and on the author's own construction.

The primary significance of grace in Greek is 'beauty,' 'charm,' 'attractiveness,' and from this comes the secondary sense of 'kindness,' 'good will,' or 'graciousness,' that is, of the mental or emotional quality lying behind an attractive appearance. In the Septuagint χάρις carries the same double significance, and thus the idea was already rough-hewn for its future position as the foundation stone of the Christian 'doctrine of grace' before the Apostle of the Gentiles began the work of chiselling it into exact lines and contours. The basic meaning, therefore, of the term 'grace,' which St. Paul found

in existence, is that of God's favour or kindliness towards man, or certain men.

But this 'favour' is not conceived merely as an abstract quality or state of His Being: it is a quality manifested in operation, of a twofold kind; there is, first, the pre-mundane act whereby He foreknows certain individuals and fore-ordains them to membership of the Church, so that the small body of Christian Jews can be described as a 'remnant constituted by an act of selection based on "grace"'; and there is, secondly, the temporal act of 'calling' and 'justifying' (or pardoning) the individual so foreknown, which, though *ex parte hominis* to be considered as contingent upon the individual's 'faith,' *ex parte Dei* is so spontaneous an ebullition of omnipotent and sovereign power that all Christians must think of themselves as 'acquitted freely, undeservedly, [solely] by an exercise of His royal grace.'

'Grace,' in Pauline thought, is thus primarily the grace of election and justification, rather than of sanctification. It has to do with the beginnings of the Christian life, its ideal beginning in God's pre-mundane counsels and its concrete beginning in time, rather than with its continuance and progress. The concept which the word connotes is regal, governmental, and judicial in character: it presupposes a way of thinking about God which regards Him as acting upon men, and shaping their destinies from without. The 'twice-born' element in St. Paul's temperament, which made his own instantaneous conversion appear to him simply as a catastrophic irruption of the Divine Will into his life, neither caused nor even prepared for by his pre-conversion training or experiences (Gal 1¹⁴), leads him to insist again and again upon the completely unmerited and gratuitous character of the Divine favour, and to inveigh against the idea that it can be earned by 'works,' or human effort of any kind.

What is true of the 'grace' which makes men members of the redeemed community is true equally of the narrower and more specialized 'grace' which appoints individuals to particular functions

in the community—apostleship, or the office of prophet or teacher—or assigns specific *charismata* to them (Ro 12⁶): all 'grace,' whether general or particular in its bearing, represents the spontaneous self-caused kindness of God towards His chosen, a kindness which no efforts of theirs could have evoked if He had not willed to feel it. Obviously the tendency of this line of thought is to exhibit the idea of the grace of election and justification as set in a context of adamant predestinarianism. And the idea of 'grace' inevitably generates the correlative idea of reprobation, the 'vessels of mercy' standing out in clear distinction from the 'vessels of wrath,' but both alike being moulded by the Almighty Potter out of the same common clay of human kind (Ro 9¹⁹⁻²⁴).

This conception of the grace of election and justification, which tends to represent God as moving His human creatures from without, like pawns on a chess-board, stands quite apart from the thought of God's subtle operations within the soul, penetrating, healing, and building up, to which the name of 'sanctifying grace' has been given by later theology. It must not be supposed, however, that this is absent from St. Paul; on the contrary, he affirms emphatically that the essence of the gospel is Divine power, sweeping on to the goal of salvation every one that believeth. But the Pauline name for this supernatural energy or power is *pneuma*, 'spirit,' and not 'grace.'

It might seem as though this omnipotent influence which penetrates the citadel of the soul was as little to be reconciled with human freedom as a sovereign Divine will compelling from without. But St. Paul refuses to admit this. In his thought, the viewless tides of 'Spirit,' or of 'the Spirit,' insensibly flood the springs of human volition in such a way that the Spirit-possessed individual does what is right because he spontaneously desires to do what is right, not because of any external sanction or coercion; the virtues which are the 'fruit of the Spirit' are also the products of his own self-determining effort. The contrasts of 'Law' and 'grace,' and of 'letter' and 'spirit' are just the contrast between the Old

Dispensation and the New, and, taken together, contain the potentiality of a unification of the ideas of 'grace' and 'spirit'; for the possession of 'spirit' is the corollary and the sure proof of the enjoyment of 'grace.'

This hint is followed up by Dr. WILLIAMS in his concluding chapter, in which he asks whether it is not possible to effect a synthesis between the two extremes exhibited in the history of human reflection on grace and freedom. He thinks the mistake of the past has been in approaching the problem from above. A more hopeful way is to regard it as belonging to the sphere of psychology, and to study the experiences and not the metaphysics of the saints. There are two great types of religious experience, that of the 'twice-born' and that of the 'once-born.' Can we strike the balance between them? Briefly, the answer is found by identifying grace with the Holy Spirit. Grace is not an impersonal something, but the influence of a Person on a person. It is 'God's presence and His very Self, and Essence all Divine.'

Dr. WILLIAMS adopts the suggestion (made years ago by Dr. Sanday and received at the time unsympathetically) that the subconscious region is the part most accessible to the Divine influence. He takes as a parallel the work of the psychotherapist, who communicates, both by suggestion and personal influence, the healing power the patient needs. Similarly, God penetrates the subconscious selves of His people through the power of His Spirit, and assists, without impairing, their free will, by a 'grace' which is real without being strictly irresistible. In this way we are able to recover the Pauline point of view concerning *pneuma* without jettisoning the familiar terminology of 'grace' consecrated by the usage of seventeen centuries.

'The haunting problem of miracles,' as Dr. Sanday called it, is always with us. A discussion of it brings us into contact with many of the most important problems in philosophy and theology, such as the personality of God, Divine providence,

the Person of Christ, the historicity of the Gospels, and the whole question of revelation. To quote Dr. Sanday again, 'This is the one crucial question which brings to a head, and includes all the rest.' We therefore give a cordial welcome to a very excellent book on the subject, *Miracle in History and in Modern Thought*, by the Rev. C. J. WRIGHT, B.D. (Constable; 18s. net), which is fitted to exercise a powerful and wholesome influence on Christian thought. It is a fine product of wide reading and clear thinking, in which the whole contentious problem of miracle is reviewed in the light of modern historical, scientific, psychological, and philosophical investigation.

Our age has witnessed a marked change of view in regard to miracles. Instead of being gloried in, as in the Apostolic Church, they are apologized for and explained away. Instead of being offered as among the chief of Christian evidences, they are felt to be an encumbrance, and an endeavour is made to prove that they may be given up without detriment to the Christian faith. Harnack says: 'The question of miracles is of relative indifference . . . the question on which everything turns is whether we are helplessly yoked to an inexorable necessity, or whether a God exists who rules and governs and whose power to compel Nature we can move by prayer and make a part of our experience.' To this the traditionalist school would reply that miracles have vital importance as the chief evidence of a God who really governs. Evidently the two sides have a different conception of miracle and of the mode of God's government.

'Deep is the significance of miracles,' says Carlyle; 'meantime the question of questions is, What specially is a miracle?' To this question the most diverse and confusing answers have been given. Miracles have been defined as violations or suspensions of natural law, as events happening without physical antecedents or by direct Divine power. On the other hand there are those, like Lord Kelvin and the Earl of Balfour, who give the term 'miraculous' to any and every normal intervention of mind in material nature. While this confusion of terms continues, it is useless to attempt to carry

forward the argument. We must agree as to what we mean by Nature and the supernatural, by law and the violation of law. In short, we must go to the root of the matter and clarify our ideas of God in His relation to the world.

But first let us consider what history and science have to say. The question which history has to answer is simply, 'What has happened in the past?' It is not whether *miracles* have happened, but whether the *events* recorded have happened. Whether any event should be designated a miracle is a question outside the scope of history. '*Event*, not *interpretative idea of event*, is the domain of historical science.' It is quite illegitimate to argue, as Hume does, that certain events cannot possibly have happened because they are designated miracles. Whether an event really happened is a totally different question from any interpretation put upon it. Similarly the question for natural science is simply, 'What are the facts?' and all the facts must be treated without bias. It is not permissible to begin by ruling out the possibility of certain facts because they are labelled as supernatural.

'It can hardly be doubted that the present condition of uncertainty in regard to miracle has been chiefly brought about by the progress of natural science,' and it has been said that science cannot admit miracle. This is really to be understood as the scientist's declaration of faith in the rationality of Nature, together with his confession that the ultimate explanation of phenomena lies beyond the realm of science. On the one hand, 'science rightly makes the postulate that there are no miracles—which is no more than saying that science goes at her task in a courageous spirit, and with a sense of responsibility. She means to puzzle over every problem to the very end, instead of giving up weakly at the first difficulty and saying, This is doubtless a miracle and hence insoluble.' On the other hand, 'whatever notion the term "miracle" carries with it, at any rate, it *does* carry that of an ultimate interpretation. Since that is so, science can never say of any event or fact that it is miraculous. To say that would be

for her to go beyond her province and enter the domain of ultimate considerations, where religion and philosophy have their home.'

The question of miracle is essentially a religious question whose solution brings into view the whole field of God's relation to the world. If the question be asked, 'What is the truth latent in the idea of miracle?' the answer is that it stands for the belief in a God who reveals Himself in us and to us, a God who is immanent in us and transcendent over us. It stands for the denial that the universe of scientific phenomena is the ground of itself, maintaining that behind event there are thought and will and love, with which man in his religious experience may have direct knowledge.' Too often has God been conceived as almost exclusively transcendent, dwelling in the realm of the supernatural, and only on rare occasions giving special evidence of His power by breaking in upon the orderly realm of Nature. This conception is not only unchristian but profoundly irreligious, inasmuch as it practically in effect excludes God from the world of Nature, or at least regards His working there as in some sense less Divine.

'The truth is that Nature's ways are God's ways; that, in other words, the natural is the supernatural mode of working. When God acts He does not "interfere" with a Nature external to Himself. We may only speak of His "interference" (ambiguous word) if He is "interfering" all the time. What we call Nature is a manifestation of His activities. Immanence stands for the refusal to "grudge God His own universe"—a view which, as Romanes so well said, is involved in the belief "that there must be something inexplicable or miraculous about a phenomenon in order to its being divine."' Yet there is a danger of passing from one extreme to the opposite. Divine transcendence must still be firmly held. The distinction between the natural and the supernatural cannot be given up. Otherwise 'we have left for ourselves no term to conserve the truth of the noumenal ground and cause of this Nature. If God be regarded as "just a synonym for Nature," then theism has gone, deism likewise,

and the sacred word *God* must be banished to the limbo of discredited anthropomorphisms.

The discussion of miracle, however, is never conducted *in vacuo*. It is the gospel miracles that keep it a living and a burning question. In regard to these, historical criticism must have perfectly free scope to inquire what in each case actually happened; a sane science will warn us not prematurely to close the question of what is possible in such a mysterious world as this; modern physics has new and strange things to tell us of the potencies of matter, and of its secret kinship with spirit; while psychical science reveals a world of unexplored possibilities in human personality. Beyond these studies and considerations there are the religious questions. 'Christianity's supreme assertion always has been, and always must be, that the personal God has acted, has manifested Himself in a more essential way than before or since, in the

person of Christ. . . . What is written in our hearts is proclaimed in time by Him who came out of eternity to reveal to us the Father. The "miracle" of His acts is not that they were interpositions of omnipotent power, but that they were manifestations of omnipotent love. It is because most of them are such that we cannot regard them as "stumbling-blocks" to be extirpated wholesale from the Gospels. While the attitude of those, who regard miracles as "proofs" of the truth as it is in Jesus, is to be, and must be, increasingly repudiated, so also is that of those who regard the gospel "miracles" as obstacles to the recognition of that truth. These latter seem to feel with Rousseau that if we could only get rid of the "miracles" the whole world would fall at the feet of Jesus. If we regard the Gospels more closely, however, we shall see that most of these "miracles" are not "stumbling-blocks" that keep men from Him, but steps that lead men to Him.'

Adolf von Harnack.

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I REMEMBER Dr. Spiecker describing to some of us a visit which, during the short peace mission to the Churches of England at the beginning of 1911, he had paid to Westminster Abbey, in company with Harnack. The visit proved by no means the cursory and formal inspection for which the authorities were prepared, for Harnack manifested intense interest in those documents of stone, was very particular in his inquiries, and insisted upon discussing numerous points with his guides.

This seems a typical revelation of the man, always intent, quick to observe, marvellously informed, and after all the study which had brought him to a position of supremacy in his own department still not only willing but profoundly eager to learn.

Never was any one more alert than Harnack. He moved rapidly and spoke quickly and fluently, sputtering somewhat at times from excitement, always very much awake and alive. Even his spectacles and his shock of upright hair contributed to the general impression of alertness.

He combined to an extent rarely achieved the

qualities of a scholar and of a teacher. In Germany more than anywhere one comes across learned men who have almost specialized away their personality. On the other hand, one knows of most effective teachers who have left no printed contribution to their subject. Harnack, however, was as great as any one of our time in both particulars, and it is doubtless for this reason that his name is so familiar to all who have any interest in either Church or University.

As a lecturer I have not known his equal. Von Wilamowitz-Moellendorf had a delightful geniality and an enticing voice which rendered him more popular. Rudolf Eucken had an impassioned eloquence which made him singularly attractive to the general public. But for effective teaching Harnack would be difficult to match.

He was a clear and ready speaker, never much hampered by his notes, and using intelligible German—as he also did when he wrote. His command of material enabled him to produce interesting illustrations of his points, and to make pertinent applications of lessons of early times to

modern conditions. He had a power of vivid description and dramatic narration, with an occasional glow of passion, so that he could make the march of events very real. His insight into character led him to give most skilful portrayals of men such as Athanasius, and he made one feel that history was about human beings in a way that books do not often succeed in suggesting, the men in the New Testament and in the Church Councils being very like their modern successors, and acting from such motives as inspire ordinary people to-day. Then there was his almost 'pawky' humour. He enjoyed his lectures and made his listeners enjoy them, especially with the assistance of illuminating asides. One admired his freedom from bitterness in discussing opponents, his obvious broad-mindedness, his true moral earnestness. Thus he easily won the confidence of his students, and gained for his views not merely the submission of minds convinced, but the heartfelt allegiance of eager captives.

His was a great personality. In him German scholarship and theology and religion had a servant who was a man of genius and standing, who could have been a master wherever he might have turned. The interesting catalogue which the *Harnack-Ehrung* of 1921 gives us of the theological leaders of American and Continental Christendom who called him master is a unique testimony to teaching powers far above the common, and had we the list of British students who have heard his lectures, from the days when Sir George Adam Smith and one or two more first 'discovered' him at Leipzig, until the gloomy years of the Great War turned our young divines somewhat vaguely to France and America for guidance, what a record of influence it would make!

As for his scholarship production, from the time as far back as 1876, when he first commanded attention by his work on the Apostolic Fathers, until he published last year's treatise on *I. Clemens-brief*, there has been a steady output of definite additions to historical and theological learning. No one has ever been so completely master of the first three centuries; but it was not merely with regard to them that Harnack could speak with judgment and, indeed, with authority. From his pen we have not only acute and suggestive discussions of New Testament problems, great and small, monumental and exact works of patristic research, investigations into the details of life in the early Church, strikingly original studies of Marcion, and essays in ecclesiastical polity, but we have illuminating treatment of Augustine, fresh

utterances on Luther and Romanism and Reformation subjects, volumes of addresses on social questions and the practical issues of War-time, even biographical sketches, while one must not overlook his extensive editorial responsibility, such as that on the *Theologische Literaturzeitung*. No doubt he was weaker when he dealt with subjects such as the Roman Church, and he certainly allows Lutheranism almost to occupy on his horizon the place which Hegel gave to the Prussian State; but everything he has written has called for attention.

Best known amongst his works are his exact and laborious *Geschichte der altchristlichen Literatur bis Eusebius*, his fascinating *Mission und Ausbreitung des Christentums in den ersten drei Jahrhunderten*, his epoch-making *Dogmengeschichte*, and his much discussed *Wesen des Christentums*. What a record of production, especially when we realize that he combined accurate and patient historical inquiry with brilliant theological leadership!

Adolf Harnack was born of an academic family in 1851, and taught at Leipzig, Giessen, and Marburg before attaining (not without conservative opposition) the post in Berlin with which his name will long be associated. He was speedily outstanding amongst the liberal theologians, and drew large classes of students. He came also to exercise important influence through his connexion with the library in Berlin, of which he was head, and various learned societies in which he took an interest, the Prussian Academy (of which he wrote an elaborate history), the Kaiser Wilhelm Society (of which as President, he is said by Von Wilamowitz-Moellendorf to have sported a specially devised uniform which was compared with the plumage of a canary!). He showed practical concern for education, but took no part in the Church courts. He won the respect and friendship of Wilhelm II., who ultimately ennobled him. He took an unhesitating stand for his country when the Great War began, and every one knows of his uncompromising retort to British scholars which is published in his *Aus der Friedens- und Kriegsarbeit*. It was a calamity to the advance of knowledge that such a breach was possible. Harnack's contribution to his subject, however, had been made before this date and was already the property of the educated world. Even in his own country his message had been given, and younger scholars were inclined to take him for granted and pass on, though one must qualify this in turn by remarking on the high quality of some of his most recent pieces of exegesis, which students will not dare to ignore. Some ten years ago he retired from his more strenuous

University work, but he did not abandon either study or lecturing, and he was still serving the cause of Truth, when, after a short illness, his long and active life came unexpectedly to a close at Heidelberg on June 10.

In his days of less maturity his ardent spirit of investigation naturally led him to expressions of opinion which alarmed the pious orthodox. Latterly his ideas were, quite as naturally, in some degree mellowed; but he did not change his point of view, and perhaps he has done as much as any one to win the confidence of the modern Protestant Churches for liberal thought, and to convince them that the true understanding and practice of the Christian Faith will come only through courageous thinking and the consecrated use of patient learning. He is a splendid justification for the method of allowing scholars to seek truth freely, untrammelled by the tests which have contributed so largely to render Scottish Calvinism hopelessly unproductive.

Harnack was always more advanced than the generality of his fellow-Ritschlians. At the same time he was never a mere assailant of orthodoxy, but definitely a seeker after truth, and in this search he not infrequently appears in support of traditional views. Thus, while the Resurrection evidence did not satisfy him, he has been one of the most effective advocates of the healing miracles. When his *Lukas der Arzt, der Verfasser des dritten Evangeliums und der Apostelgeschichte* appeared, Professor Nicol could write with astonishment of 'Harnack among the Apologists.' And he was always willing to modify his opinions as new evidence presented itself to him.

Not every deduction and guess which Harnack made will live. I don't suppose many people seriously attribute *Hebrews* to Priscilla. Others of his conclusions will remain for long matter of divided opinion amongst scholars. Some will continue to prefer Schürer or Foakes-Jackson in their estimate of Luke, or possibly Swete on the pre-existence of Christ. But even where he has been carried away in the excitement of brilliant discoveries and has mistaken the part for the whole, he has done much to rouse the Church to consciousness of significant matters previously ignored or misconstrued. His very over-emphasis of Hellenistic influences may be placed in this category.

It must, however, be emphasized that the greater part of what he has done has a validity that is not affected by his special point of view. He may be most widely known as the advocate of these special

views. Popularly he is no doubt the author of *What is Christianity?* But of greater service to the Church are accumulations of documentary evidence in so many of his books, and works such as his *Geschichte der altchristlichen Literatur*, which never find their way into ordinary libraries.

It was in connexion with the History of Doctrine that Harnack's special theories emerged. This is a science which, as Baur admits, began in Aberdeen with the work of John Forbes of Corse. Since then it has been almost entirely German, and owes most to Baur, who saw everything in the light of Hegel and made experience progressively elucidate revelation, and to Harnack, who takes an entirely different view. He watches the original complete historical revelation being variously interpreted and misinterpreted, twisted and disguised and managed, each generation finding what it thinks it needs, but none being really saved except in so far as it goes back to the true Person of Christ manifested in the Synoptic Gospels.

As a good Ritschlian, Harnack centres all upon the historical Jesus, assigning ecclesiastical dogma a subordinate place, as accretion and non-essential, though scarcely justifying Pfeiderer's criticism that he regards the history of doctrine as a progressive obscuring of Christian truth.

Harnack attempts to distinguish the essential from the non-essential in the series of transformations, and it is the explanation of his guiding beliefs on this which he offered in his *Wesen des Christentums*. By his theory, however, he has given up all real claim to state what is normative in Christianity. He can only say what appeals to him. Loisy puts his finger on this fatal weakness, and simply rejects Harnack's essential core. Harnack also assumes that only a movement's historical origins exhibit its genuine nature, which is not a doctrine which bears examination. His simplification of Christianity is too simple. It is hopeless to expect every one to find the same Jesus even in the Synoptic Gospels. He himself states what he holds to be the leading features of Jesus' message as, the Kingdom of God and its coming, God the Father and the infinite value of the human soul, and the higher righteousness and the commandment of love. This, however, is to select rather than to analyse. It lays great stress on the ethical and it ignores Apocalyptic. It declares practically every characteristic type of our religion—for example, mysticism—to be un-Christian. Harnack was so unsympathetic to the mediæval that it is curious he did not observe how mediæval it is to seek the essence of anything by abstraction.

The ideas in the *Wesen des Christentums* are admirably expressed, and the book was extremely popular; but one cannot suppose that it completely satisfies any one to-day, especially since Troeltsch has shown so much more philosophical acumen in his investigation of just such problems. Troeltsch has certainly brought us a step beyond Harnack.

Similarly, however, in his day Harnack provided the much-needed corrective to the evolutionary optimistic view of history which had so long been dominant under the influence of Hegel, and of which we still sometimes meet the ghost, since Herbert Spencer and Karl Marx have encouraged it, and it suits the teleological conceptions of many Christians. It is nevertheless too easy, as the Ritschlian in Harnack perceived. Progress is a much more irrational business than we are apt to think when we reason backwards through time. One does not go far in history with the help of mere logic. Things do sometimes go wrong; and it is scarcely fair to bow to the victor so abjectly as is customary.

It was because he realized the inadequacy of such ideas of uncoiling perfection that Harnack so dearly loved a good heretic, such as Marcion or Theodore of Mopsuestia. At times he would have liked his heretic to kill the dragon and win the princess. Certainly his heretics always had a real chance, and not as with Baur a merely formal share in the inevitable movement, appearing so as to be ignominiously knocked on the head. Since Harnack, no one can doubt the vital importance of the contribution which the heretics have made to Christian thought.

It was Harnack, further, who so clearly recognized that the theological and ecclesiastical do not form a world apart. This seems fairly obvious to us, but it required to be said, for it was not recognized by such forerunners in the sphere of History of Doctrine as Neander. Developments in those departments are dependent upon the general conditions of life. Personalities, economics, politics, all exercise definite influence upon them. The whole environment of the Christian is acting upon his religious consciousness. Doubtless Harnack went too far in suggesting that these influences of the times so often caused 'total perversion' of Christianity.

His *Dogmengeschichte* is governed by this pre-supposition. First, Greek philosophical and cultural influences, then Roman imperial, then Augustinian theological, then mediæval pagan obscured the Galilean gospel, and to release Christianity from

such Babylonian captivity was the achievement of Luther. This is the process he traces in Church History.

Harnack's chief antipathy was naturally to Greek metaphysical theology. Here was the greatest of the perversions. Dogma he regarded as the work of the Greeks, and an unfortunate work at that. No one dreams of denying the tremendous part played by Greece in the development of what we know as Christianity. Most people rejoice that its marvellous legacy of thought and culture was not lost to the Church, and this however much they dislike Dogma. It is also clear that apart from this acceptance of Greece by Christianity there would have been no acceptance of Christianity by Greece. Christianity would have died in Palestine. Harnack is quite right that beyond the language there is practically nothing Greek about the Synoptics; and yet to make so much of this as he does, and to point out that early Christian literature 'apart from Paul, Luke, and John' shows little sign of Greek influence, is to call our religion a changeling from its earliest infancy. One fancies also that Gnosticism bulks somewhat too prominently in Harnack's Greece.

His main point, however, is justified, for what he attacks is the placing of theology and much else before religion. Christianity to him is not a set of opinions, but a life; and any one who considers the Scottish mania for Covenants and Confessions and Catechisms, and the remoteness of most of our preaching until very recent times from the practical concerns of common people will recognize how valuable his protest and reminder must have been. It is only a pity that such a work of genius as the *Dogmengeschichte* should have even so valuable teaching as its bias and standpoint; but not even Ranke could see without his eyes, and it is something to feel the personality of Harnack throughout his work, for this antipathy to the metaphysical is 'essential' Harnack.

He had been in trouble about his attitude to intellectual expressions of the Faith quite early in his career. It was when he took occasion to protest against the use of the Apostles' Creed as a test for ordination. There was a serious dispute, and he published his views in his *Apostolische Glaubensbekenntnis*, which passed through many editions. The Creed represented to him Greek theology and not the Synoptic message. He wished a simpler formula, embodying what he regarded as the fundamentals. His selection was subjective, though he did not think so, believing it entirely a matter of historic facts, and forgetting

to what extent 'facts' are mind-produced. He would have been more historical had he recognized that this must always be the case, and had he simply pressed for the abandonment of the theological test. But his guiding thought was just what inspired his *Dogmengeschichte* and his *Wesen des Christentums*. It was his intense belief in the truth and beauty and glory of the Christianity of Jesus, and his feeling that that is what we need to live to-day, and that all else is accretion.

By Harnack's death a career of great distinction

and usefulness and a life that was full and rich came to an end, and the loss to the Christian Church is not small. A man of high intellectual gifts, broad interests, wide experience, and tireless activity, a courageous leader of religious thought, a respected public figure, he has by his researches made the Church stronger and wiser than he found it. When a cause is genuine there is no apologetic like thorough investigation, and from this point of view Adolf von Harnack must be acclaimed a true defender of the Faith.

The Mind of Christ on Moral Problems of To-day.

VII.

Temperance.

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ONE by one the claims of Alcohol to a place in human life are disappearing. Men used to think it was a food ; medical science says it is a drug and dangerous at that. Men thought it necessary to health and physical fitness, and now athletes will have none of it ; doctors tell us it diminishes our power of resistance to infection and slows the process of convalescence. It was claimed that it was a help to the endurance of fatigue and cold ; but arctic explorers and mountain climbers and other pioneers fight shy of it. It was claimed that with alcohol a man could do his work better, but directly the claim was submitted to objective tests it was proved that, whatever the worker himself felt about it, the work done under its influence was less in quantity and inferior in quality. Not long ago alcohol was credited with therapeutic value, but its use in hospitals has reached almost a vanishing point. It was the theory of Dickens and his contemporaries that there could be no social jollity without it, but our large Holiday Associations and Travel Clubs have cut it out, and even in Germany the great Youth Movement has discarded it as part of the musty tradition of the past.

If these things are not known, it is due to ignorance, though such ignorance is found among highly educated people. Their ignorance is certainly not due to the withholding of knowledge.

Now the great obstacle to the progress of temperance is the new vivid sense of personal liberty which is characteristic of our day. To woman and to youth there has come a new emancipation. Now as never before they have the ordering of their lives in their own hand, and like the newly emancipated slaves of 1865 they have not yet adjusted themselves to the new conditions. 'May I not do as I like ? If I sign this pledge of abstinence, am I not putting myself once more under restraint ? If alcohol increases the pleasures of life, why should I forgo it ? Is it not an unnecessary curtailment ? Besides, if I vote for this local option, am I not putting under compulsion a whole company of other men and women who do not see as I do ? Am I not imposing my own personal taste upon them ? And, in any case, does it not betoken a stronger will-power and superior self-control to use alcohol than to swear off ?'

The answer is simple. It is twofold.

First, for every man to do as he likes is anarchy. Liberty is not anarchy. If each individual motorist drove as he liked, as fast as he chose, either on the right hand or on the left, not caring for any signals or any one else's safety, his own safety would soon be at an end. A man's liberty is not a personal thing ; it is civic, that is to say, it is conditioned all the time by his social environment. His liberty

must not interfere with the liberty of other people, nor be inconsistent with the health and general well-being of the whole of which he forms a part. A person is a mere infinitesimal fraction of a whole integer. Apart from the integer, he has no existence unless he lives like Robinson Crusoe in inglorious solitude, whether as *θεός* or *θύσιον*. It is true, indeed, that Christ insists on the infinite value of each human soul. His sacrifice was for the sin of the individual and the salvation of the individual, as well as for the sin and salvation of the whole world. But no man liveth unto himself or dieth unto himself. If he perishes, he drags others down with him. If he is saved, he is saved into a society which we call the Church.

Secondly, a man finds his liberty not in his own will but in God's. When he is saved he gives up his own will and identifies himself with the will of God. His body becomes 'the instrument of Deity.' He takes upon him a yoke, he becomes a fellow-worker with God. This is the paradox of Christianity. St. Paul is the 'bond slave' of the Saviour who set him free. In that bond-service he finds perfect freedom. Freedom is never aimless, it must have an end in view, it is not an end in itself. Unconfined steam vanishes into nothingness. Steam which is under control serves the ends of man. The cry for freedom for freedom's sake takes us nowhere. Freedom is simply a man's power to fulfil his impulses. Man's impulses are of two kinds, higher and lower. The lower impulses he shares with the lower creation. So long as he prefers them he is not distinctively man. Man, like everything else, has to be defined by his differentia—not by what he has in common with the brutes, but by what makes him superior to them. He has no right to any freedom save that which fulfils the higher law of his manhood. And that higher law of his being he can fulfil only in common with his fellow-humans. The higher his aims, the more the principle of sharing comes into the fulfilling of them. The Kingdom of Heaven is the fellowship of men and women, whose law of life is love, in whom God lives as Father, Jesus as Lord, and in which all men are brothers through communion in the Spirit.

The question then is—What is the position of alcohol in a society of human beings which is deliberately shaping its common life towards this end, in the Spirit of this Kingdom of God? Setting this aim before them, how will the fellow-men of Christ act as citizens of the State? Clearly they will use their power as citizens, their vote, their personal influence and energy, to securing whatever

conduces to this end. Every political proposal will be judged by this test; does it conduce or does it not conduce to the Kingdom of God?

In this matter of alcoholic liquor, a man's first impulse may be to say, 'This matter is personal to myself. The effect may be as medical science tells me, a certain lowering of my higher faculties, but I must risk that. I think it is worth while. I have worries which I am anxious to put away from me. Alcohol helps me to forget them. Give me the *obliviosum Massicum*, as Horace called it.'

The answer to this argument is threefold. In order that you may gratify this desire which you reckon harmless, you must consider that the same facilities which are provided for you to obtain alcohol must be open to every other citizen in the same degree as they are to yourself. But you are fully aware that alcohol is a stumbling-block to innumerable of your fellow-citizens—to the young, the immature, to many who have an inherited proclivity to alcoholic craving, who once they taste alcohol are incapable of moderation. The price to be paid for your personal indulgence (for that is what your personal liberty amounts to) is too great. John Stuart Mill leaves no doubt on this point. 'Whenever there is definite damage, or definite risk of damage, to an individual or to the public, the case is taken out of the province of liberty and placed in that of morality and law.'

Secondly, the organ of your personality is the brain. Alcohol has an immediate action on the brain, and especially on its higher controlling centres. Directly you imbibe alcohol, it passes into your blood and is present in your brain. Its presence in the brain immediately impairs your personality. The more you imbibe, the less becomes your consciousness, until with drunkenness you lose all control of thought, feeling, and action. To take alcohol at all, even in moderation, is in so far a temporary resignation of your birthright as a man, a temporary relegation of oneself to a lower level, a frustration of the soul, a sin against your own highest self. A man cannot achieve freedom of personality by first of all putting his personality under the spell of a drug.

Lastly, whatever a man does has influence upon others. Even if the man himself knows when to stop and does stop (which is another and more difficult matter), others may not be able. An inner impulse they cannot withstand will drive them on. What was comparatively harmless to the one may mean catastrophe to the other. A man is his brother's keeper. 'The love of liberty,' says Hazlitt, 'is the love of others.' This is the

opposite, it is the assertion of self, no matter what happens to others.

It is at this point that one parts company with William James. In asking why men take to drink, he discovers the chief impelling force to be the desire for exhilaration, the wish to forget about the present with its monotony of routine, its limitations and menaces of evil. There are times when a man craves, above all other things, for the sense of victory over his surroundings; he reaches out to feel himself something greater than himself. Every man at certain moments would give anything to be like Tam o' Shanter:

Kings may be blest, but Tam was glorious,
O'er a' the ills o' life victorious!

And this *is* the feeling a man achieves for the moment, but for the moment only, under the influence of the alcohol drug. But when the philosopher speaks of this as an expansion of the personality, he is wrong. It seems to be, it is felt so to be. But things are not always what they seem. And above all other things strong drink is a mocker:

To see the world as it is not,
Look into the pewter-pot.

What happens is the exact opposite. Instead of expanding, the higher self is narcotized and so inhibited. The lower self slipping the leash has its fling.

It is this contrast of the counterfeit and the true which St. Paul brings out when he says: 'Be not filled with new wine wherein is excess, but be filled with the Spirit.' To every man there comes at times a season of exaltation when he is lifted to higher levels of being and feels the fire burn within him and sees golden gates of Eden gleam. And in those hours of vision the great vows are made which it takes a life's work to fulfil:

Tasks in hours of insight willed
May be thro' hours of gloom fulfilled.

But it is not under the spell of alcohol that the clear vision comes and the brave purposes are willed. The moment on the mount is a moment we would fain recall, but it does not come at our beck and call:

We cannot summon when we will
The fire that in the soul resides.
The Spirit bloweth and is still
In mystery the soul abides.

St. Paul warns us that to call in the help of alcohol is not the way.

So far from being a liberation, it is alcohol which makes the worst attacks on the liberty of others and of ourselves. It acts as a cause for a majority of those disorderly attacks upon the person of others which range from indecent assault to murder. It is intimately associated with fornication and venereal disease. At the same time, like morphine, it begets a passionate craving for itself which is more than the victim of it can resist, and becoming 'an addict' he signs a paper committing himself to confinement in some sanatorium or other place of treatment, subjecting his body to rigid restraint in order to save himself from relapse into slavery.

The greatest of all inhibitions upon liberty is, after all, in our time not political but economic. It is poverty. Some say that poverty leads to drink; others that drink leads to poverty. If poverty leads to drink, it is obvious that wealth does not deliver from drink. Two facts may suffice to prove this statement. An increase in the volume of trade always means an increase in the money spent on liquor. In the Colleges of Oxford and Cambridge drunkenness is still a problem. The truth is, of course, that both statements are true. Drink means a decrease of efficiency, and decrease of efficiency means loss of wage-earning power and consequent poverty; poverty in turn drives men to seek forgetfulness of its misery in drink. It is a vicious circle. Certainly economic improvement of itself is never going to deliver us from the tyranny of liquor.

It was Abraham Lincoln, the great liberator, who pointed to the emancipation of the human race from the bondage of alcohol as the next great task that confronted humanity. It is an age-long bondage, deeply entrenched in social custom, strongly buttressed with vested financial interests, willingly accepted by its victims who reap from it a short-lived sensuous pleasure. It can array in opposition to any one who attacks it the great powers of society, finance, politics, journalism, ridicule, the appetitular nature of man. But when it is arraigned before the high tribunal of the conscience of man, the evidence against it is damning and the argument for it is null. Most pitiful and ironical of all is its plea that it stands for human liberty.

Two points are of cardinal importance. The first is that temperance is the way of positive joy, not a curtailment but a fulfilment of life. When the Temperance Movement started a hundred years ago, the emphasis was laid on abstinence. It was a case of cutting oneself off from a definitely established social habit. Thus the way of the

abstainer has been associated with negative action, and the phrases in common use such as 'abstinence,' 'prohibition,' and 'local veto,' too often suggest something negative, a maiming so to speak of life, something opposed to the general trend of human desire.

It is high time this was changed. In society to-day it is the drinker who is the exception, and the drinker himself is for the most of his time an abstainer, his drinking is occasional. Abstinence does not imply a social taboo. The most hopeful thing about the Temperance Movement is that it is now seen as the way to fullness and joyfulness of living. It is the way of sport, the way of music, the way of the open-air life, and the great holiday movements which take increasing numbers every year out of the great cities into the country, to the mountains and the sea. The Band of Hope trains the children to think of temperance in terms of social happiness and recreation, and every organization for girls and boys in connexion with settlements and missions, every gate that is opened up for the use of our new and generous leisure into the realms of music, art, and culture, helps the same healthful idea of social joy without the false aid of alcohol. Men are won not by pinched negatives, but by the heartening call of the positive. For joy and health and fullness of living temperance holds all the trump cards.

The second point is that action has got beyond the individual stage ; it must be collective.

The first aim of the Temperance Movement was to save the individual from the drink habit. It did not take long to convince temperance workers that the liquor traffic was destroying lives faster than temperance could save them. Collective action was needed if humanity was to be delivered. Under a democracy collective action is only possible when a majority which knows its mind acts positively. It can act only through the State.

Says Georges Clemenceau :

'The State, with all the powerful weapons at its disposal, stands an indifferent spectator of an evil beside which the great epidemics of the past are no more than commonplace incidents in the human drama.' Democracy has yet to realize the moral

possibilities of State action and the moral responsibilities of State inaction. 'The great multiplication of virtues upon human nature,' as Bacon says, 'resteth upon societies well ordered and disciplined.' The instrument of further progress is State action.

As things are, a local community has no right to formulate its will in the matter of the continuance or discontinuance of the liquor traffic in its midst. The democratic principle has been made effective in Scotland, but people living in England and Wales have no such power to formulate their will and pleasure and put their decision into force.

The Temperance Campaign is the one great social reform in which the Churches as Churches are united and organized, and they are right in putting this question of Local Option in the forefront of their programme. The way in which the Almighty saves the people is by giving them the power to save themselves. Let the people once feel that the responsibility for the continuance of this traffic and all its attendant evils lies on their own shoulders, and we shall see the process of emancipation begin to go steadily forward.

The liquor traffic to-day stands where the slave traffic stood eighty years ago. Abraham Lincoln foresaw that after the abolition of slavery the next great act of emancipation would be the abolition of the liquor traffic. The rate of advance has been slow since Abraham Lincoln made that prophecy. But taking the large view there is no doubt that the movement of things has been steadily and increasingly in that direction. In spite of the powerful forces of society, of big finance and journalism which are arrayed against us, and—stronger than all these—the doping power of drink itself, men are becoming more and more conscious of what the inevitable end of the struggle is to be. 'Every tree that my Father hath not planted shall be plucked up.'

'If the relative grandeur of revolutions shall be estimated by the great amount of human misery they alleviate and the small amount they inflict, then indeed will this, the temperance revolution, be the grandest the world shall ever win.' The man who said this was the man who struck the death-blow to slavery in the United States of America.

Literature.

HEBREW RELIGION.

A SCHOLARLY book in English on Hebrew Religion, elaborate but not too elaborate, has for some time been a desideratum, and now we have it. It is a composite work from the competent hands of Professor W. O. E. Oesterley, D.D., of London, and Professor T. H. Robinson, D.D., of Cardiff. The subjects or periods with which they respectively deal are those which their already published works show that they have made peculiarly their own, Dr. Oesterley dealing with such questions as Ancestor Worship, Demonology, and Wisdom, and Dr. Robinson with the Prophets, though there are not a few points at which each enters the domain of the other.

The book, *Hebrew Religion* (S.P.C.K.; 10s. 6d. net), is divided into three parts: (1) The Background, which discusses primitive religion, with such phenomena as animism and totemism; (2) The Israelite Religion, which carries the story from Moses to the Fall of Jerusalem; and (3) Judaism. The method, which is in the main chronological, is a happy blend of the chronological and the topical, and the conclusions, which are nowhere marred by extravagant idiosyncrasies, would in the main command the assent of most Old Testament scholars to-day. We hear, for example, of occasional traces of imitative magic; we are told that there are good grounds for believing that some remnants of totemism and ancestor-worship are to be found in the Old Testament; that the stones within the Ark were perhaps originally stones taken from the sacred mountain; and that the Sabbath was not borrowed from either the Canaanites or the Babylonians but probably originated among the ancient nomadic Arabs. Those who cannot read Gressmann in the original will be glad to have the sketch of his view of Mount Sinai as a volcanic mountain, which satisfactorily explains so many features of the Exodus narrative and helps us to locate the mountain.

There is a brief but excellent account of the canonical prophets, in which Dr. Robinson repeats the view to which he has already given expression, that the prophets were not implacably opposed to the cult (pp. 201 and 299). While affinities between Babylonian and Hebrew religion are frankly admitted, it is contended that no essential doctrine or religious practice of Judaism was the result of Babylonian religious influence. Persian influence,

on the other hand, exercised a real influence, at any rate in the domain of Eschatology and Apocalyptic. The section on Immortality, much as has been written on this subject, is arresting and original. It is interesting to find that the two collaborators do not quite agree in their view of the Servant in Deutero-Isaiah. Dr. Oesterley thinks that the national interpretation is 'quite out of the question'; he takes the Servant to be 'a real, not an idealized man,' who was believed by the prophet to be the Messiah, and who was to rise from the dead to take the part assigned to Him by God.

This statement, like others in the book, as, for example, that 'Yahweh dwelt between the Cherubim' in the early period, will of course be challenged; but the solid learning of the book and its persuasive sketch of the development of Hebrew religion are beyond challenge. The absence of any reference to the universalism of the Book of Jonah is rather surprising; no Old Testament book touches loftier heights than this. There is a curious preference for the word 'forebears' (spelt forebears' on p. 63), cf. pp. 47, 82, 92, 119, 317. On p. 80 Is lv. 2-4 should be lxv. The book effectively meets a real want and ought to receive a wide welcome.

CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN PHILOSOPHY.

'The biographical part of literature is what I love most,' so said Samuel Johnson; and what is true of literature is equally true of philosophy. In any case these two handsome volumes, *Contemporary American Philosophy*, ed. by G. P. Adams and W. P. Montague (Allen & Unwin; 16s. net each), containing personal statements by the best known living American philosophers, are full of interest. Some years ago we had 'Contemporary British Philosophers,' and now is the turn of the American. Thirty-four eminent scholars, chosen by the vote of their brethren, give us short accounts of their life and of their philosophical point of view. If any one longs for unanimity of outlook in the philosophic world as represented by these writers, he will be sadly disappointed. We have all the well-known historical schools of philosophy here, from the absolute idealism of Miss Calkins (tinged with just a little pragmatism) to the instrumentalism of Dr. Dewey and the

naturalism of Cohen, as well as the picturesque æstheticism of Santayana. From this kaleidoscopic variety it might almost appear as if philosophy's progress was nothing more than the periodicity of eternal recurrence, for it would not be difficult to place most of these thinkers without undue violence into the framework of the philosophic schools of Greece. And yet there is a difference—a difference of wider horizons, of chastened expectations and of scientific method. The most interesting contribution is perhaps that of the venerable Dr. Palmer, the doyen of philosophic thinkers in America now that William James, Josiah Royce, and Borden Bowne are gone. It is intimately personal and biographical, and, for a philosopher, seriously religious and Christian. From it and from other papers in these volumes we can learn how stimulating and bracing the influence of James and Royce was. This we have found the most interesting of all the papers, and next to it is that of Hartley Burr Alexander, of whose concluding sentences we would simply quote this: 'My courage is little from myself, but much from the sign, upreared on a hill loftier than Acropolis, where through suffering came not the wisdom of the Greeks, but the hope of all mankind.'

On the whole it is heartening to find that so many of the writers, and these among the best, have a religious philosophy of life. In some cases the religion is more a mystical kind of animism or revived Stoicism than positive Christianity, as, for example, in the case of Everett and Leighton (who is surely rather pessimistic as to the present state of education in America). But this is better than naturalism, and of this there is very little, and even it is tinged with an agnosticism which is not far from the Kingdom of God. One or two are frankly materialistic and hostile to Christianity, and a few more are indifferent. But perhaps their indifference is due to restraint and the feeling that philosophy as a discipline had better keep away from religion—for which, methodologically, something may be said.

While it would be unfair to these thinkers to judge them wholly on the meagre pronouncements of these limited chapters, on the other hand a reading of this book will serve as the best introduction to their larger works and as an excellent orientation for the reader who, with little time at his disposal, desires to know what those who are called philosophers think of life and its problems. One general impression abides from the reading of these composite volumes. It is the Socratic longing for a sure word from heaven, a yearning for

revelation. It would be invidious to name those whom we think most inspiring, but the chapters by Urban, Tufts, and Perry strike us as above the average. We thank Dr. Muirhead, the Editor of the Library of Philosophy, for this additional obligation to the many others which we owe to his selective and organizing industry.

BEYOND PHYSICS.

Beyond Physics, by Sir Oliver Lodge (Allen & Unwin; 5s. net), is a work which deserves, and will doubtless command, the attention and careful study of all who are interested in the philosophic interpretation of the new physics. The mental attitude of the writer is indicated in the preface. 'If it could be recognized that no one statement can be comprehensive enough to exhaust the whole truth about anything, many of our semi-scientific semi-theological controversies would evaporate into thin air.' While finding himself in general agreement with Professors Eddington and Whitehead, Sir Oliver has some acute criticisms to offer of certain widely accepted theories. He is not satisfied with the theory that simultaneity is conditioned by the speed of light; he is dubious about the paradoxical observations of the hypothetical high-speed observers beloved of relativists; and he is bold enough to hope, in spite of the Michelson-Morley experiment, that some means may yet be found of measuring absolute velocity through the ether.

His main thesis deals with the relation of mind and matter. Physics has by successive steps pushed its analysis of matter to the point where it has reached the electron and found it to be not something material in the old sense, but an energy-knot. The electron itself is now in process of being analysed, and according to some theories, for example Schrödinger's, it is conceived as something in the nature of a group-wave which has a motion and an energy of its own though it is constantly influenced by its constituent waves. Sir Oliver Lodge sees in this a possible solution of an old philosophical difficulty, the difficulty, namely, that if mind influence matter it must needs communicate energy to it, whereas physical analysis can detect no such energy thus communicated. Here, he argues, we have purely physical analysis suggesting that sub-physical entities influence a physical without imparting energy. 'The group waves follow a path determined by the constituent waves, which therefore act as a guiding and directing agent, elusive in itself, but important as exercising control. The present idea is that certain

etheric group-waves constitute matter, and that this is a form of energy capable of being guided by something other than energy, something which acts as a guiding or directing principle.' How far this hypothesis meets the philosophic difficulty it would be difficult to say, but there can be no doubt that the theory is a distinct contribution to a profoundly interesting and mysterious subject.

THE JEWS AND THE ASHANTI.

It seems a far cry from the Jews to the Ashanti, but Mr. Joseph J. Williams, Ph.D., Litt.D., has written an extraordinarily interesting book, with the rather unhappy title *Hebrewisms of West Africa* (Allen & Unwin; 30s. net), to prove that there is a real connexion between the two, or, to be more exact, that 'Hebrew culture found its way, long centuries ago, from the Nile to the Niger.' The sub-title, *From Nile to Niger with the Jews*, gives a better idea than the title of the thesis which the book is written to support, namely, that Jewish colonists in Upper Egypt found their way along the valley of the Nile, profoundly affected Abyssinian culture, in course of time moved across the plains of Central Africa by Lake Chad, and finally reached and left their mark upon the tribes of West Africa. All this, of course, was the work of centuries. But there was another stream of influence from the North. Colonies of Jews studded the African shores of the Mediterranean, and from an early date 'there was a strong Hebraic influence in the North of Africa which through infiltration and commerce had left its mark on the Sahara, and even southward to the neighbourhood of the River Niger.' Indeed there was, south of the Sahara, a Jewish kingdom of Ghana, which had flourished for several centuries and then been so entirely obliterated that its very existence was long questioned, and the site of its capital has only quite recently been located.

Dr. Williams claims that there are remarkable affinities between Jewish and Ashanti ideas, customs, and even languages. No possible claim, of course, could be made that they belong to the same linguistic group, but 'not a few Hebrew words and possibly certain distinctive Hebrew constructions have been ingrafted on the native language of the Ashanti'—and illustrations are given. He compares the Ashanti Yame with the Hebrew Yahweh, and emphasizes the 'truly remarkable similarity' not only in the words themselves but in the conceptions attached to them. He further enumerates scores of cultural and religious elements

which the two peoples have in common; for example, the patriarchal system, uncleanness after childbirth, purification ceremonies, sterility a curse, the 'oath-drink,' expectation of a Messiah, Sabbath rest, Levirate marriages, bloody sacrifices with the sprinkling of blood upon altar and doorposts, etc.; and he finds in the phrase, to 'make obi,' which has come to Jamaica through the old Ashanti slaves, an exact parallel to עָשָׂה אֹבִי in 2 K 21⁶.

While fully recognizing that many of the features he mentions can be paralleled in the religions and cultures of other peoples, he believes that, in their cumulative effect, they can be most satisfactorily explained by assuming that 'in the dim past, a wave, or more probably a series of waves, of Hebraic influence swept over Negro Africa, leaving unmistakable traces among the various tribes, where they have endured even to the present day.' Dr. Williams offers it as his personal conviction, after eleven years of research, that, 'explain it as you will, a Jewish element is to be found in the parent-stock of the Ashanti.' He modestly adds, 'We cannot postulate any degree of certitude for this theory,' but he has spared no pains to substantiate it. His interesting pages are crowded with excerpts from the works of scholars, travellers, and anthropologists, and his bibliography runs to over one thousand names. His argument—if, as he thinks, 'time will strengthen its credibility'—will compel us to enlarge our idea of 'the Dispersion.'

INDIVIDUAL PSYCHOLOGY.

Vienna seems to be the seed-plot of new psychologies. It produced Freud, did it not? And it has sheltered Dr. Alfred Adler, whose system goes under the name 'Individual Psychology.' This is, like Freudism, a psychotherapy and also a pedagogy (is it necessary to have quite such hideous names for these processes?), but there is systematic thinking behind it, and Dr. Erwin Wexberg, a co-worker of Adler's, has set himself to expound this system in his book *Individual Psychology* (Allen & Unwin; 15s. net). The book is translated by Dr. W. Béran Wolfe, and reads fairly easily, or at least naturally. Not that the matter is easy. There is a sort of ponderous vagueness which makes it difficult for the English reader to grasp exactly where individual psychology differs from any other psychology. The central point seems to be that every living organism is a purposive or conative unity 'whose goal is the maintenance of its own existence.' The evolution of this personality is traced, and the factors, social

and economic, sexual, family, pedagogic, which contribute to its existence and growth, are handled in a series of chapters.

There are not a few points at which an acute difference of opinion will arise. Dr. Wexberg is so impressed by the faults of parents and the defects of family life that he thinks the education of children should be a communal affair. It is, however, in the chapter on education that one feels most disposed to question some conclusions. 'Any one,' says the author, 'who investigates the matter objectively must be convinced of the fact that religious concepts cannot be taught to children . . . no child can understand the spiritual content of religion. Any one who desires to educate his children to be religious men and women would do well never to mention a religious concept to them before they are fourteen or fifteen years old. . . . Religious education of children can have but one consequence: the inhibition of the free development of the child's sense of personal self-esteem.' It would be disrespectful to say what we think of this extraordinary opinion. But, no doubt, a practical teacher who knows anything about children will be able to supply the missing words.

These points are not, however, vital to the general thesis. And it is only fair to say that the development of the organism is traced with great ability, and the treatment of its ills, defects, and faults, medically and otherwise, is expounded from the point of view of this system clearly and fully. Those who wish to know what Adler's standpoint and technique are will find an authoritative statement in this large and competent volume.

PRAYER.

Prayer, by Mario Puglisi (Macmillan; 10s. 6d. net), is interesting as exhibiting the international solidarity of the study of religion. The author is an Italian liberal modernist who has already some thirteen books to his credit. Here he deals with the fascinating theme of prayer, on which so much has been written of recent years that one can read this book in the light of Heiler and Hastings and others. The standpoint is that of a modified mystical pragmatism, and the method is the historical and comparative one so much in vogue through the comparative study of religion.

The writer traces the manifestations and methods of the prayer life from the hazy dawn of magic right down to the philosophic and pantheistic theory of acquiescence of soul in the world process, so that there is danger that we cannot see the wood

for the trees. There is much information and thought in this excellent work, besides the value and imperative need of prayer both in its individual and communal aspects.

We welcome the book for it helps us to answer what in our opinion is the real problem of prayer for us to-day. Behind the problem of prayer is our view of God. Is He and is His will an unalterable law in the scientific view of law, or can He act personally in response to His children's needs? Is prayer just a cable or boat-hook which we project to draw our feeble bark to the immovable Rock of Ages, or can He come to our help in our necessities, or can these two views be harmonized? The writer helps us to answer this, and he writes with an earnest practical purposiveness and a broad cultured outlook. As we read we feel like saying, 'Lord, teach us to pray.' The translator, Dr. Allen, has done his work well, for the book reads as smoothly as if it had been written directly in English. But why is there no index?

A NEW TRANSLATION OF THE PSALMS.

Professor Herbert H. Gowen, D.D., of Washington, offers *A New Transcription and Translation of the Psalms* (S.C.M.; 7s. 6d. net). This he prefaces by a well-written Introduction which deals, among other things, with the Principles of Hebrew Poetry, the Poetry of the Psalms and the Use of the Psalter. The main object of the book, however, is to recover, so far as possible, the original text and to present it in the form of a translation which will do something like justice to its literary values. The innumerable textual problems have been frankly faced, and verses, such as 49¹⁵, which are for metrical or other reasons believed to be glosses, are excluded from the text and relegated to the notes. Often drastic, but reasonable, emendations are accepted and incorporated in the translation; cf. 45⁶, where an original יהיה ('shall be'), as it seems, has become first יהוה, and then אלהים ('O God'); similarly 84⁷, 'From rampart to rampart they go: *El Elohim in Zion is seen.*' On this principle, however, instead of 'Truly God to Israel is good: To the pure in heart' (73¹), we should have expected Dr. Gowen to give us 'Truly God is good to the upright, even Elohim (or Yahweh ?), to the pure in heart.'

The historical origin of a psalm is frequently suggested, though obviously this must be in most, if not in all, cases conjectural: for example, Ps 46 is assigned to the reign of Hezekiah or Josiah; Ps 110 to the second century B.C., with Simon for

its theme; Ps 74 to the destruction of Jerusalem by Nebuchadnezzar—this last psalm being adapted by a Maccabean editor to his own times. Good use is made of the ancient versions; for example, the LXX is followed in 90³, 'O turn not man back into dust.' While exception could be fairly taken to occasional phrases—we do not, for example, admire 'He shall not drowse' in 121⁴—the translation on the whole is both dignified and musical, and is certainly a very honest and not unsuccessful attempt to penetrate beneath later accretions and glosses to the original text. These few lines from Ps 39 will illustrate the style and quality of the translation:

I said: I will look to my ways:
 Lest I sin with my lips.
 I was dumb and kept silence from good:
 Though sore was my pain.
 Hot within was my heart in my musing:
 Smouldered the fire.
 Then I spake with my tongue: Let me know,
 O Yahweh, mine end!

Creative Preaching, edited by Mr. G. Bromley Oxnam (Abingdon Press; \$2.50), is a rich, stimulating volume on preaching, entrancing in its variety. We began it in a listless mood, for books on preaching are often dull, but we ended with a feeling of elation. From the first lecture by Dr. James Moffatt, emphasizing the majesty and mystery of great preaching, to the last, which deals with the contribution of the dramatist to the preacher's material, every paper is distinctive and notable. The literary qualities of the book are worthy even of traditional Boston, and yet, deeper than the literary flavour, and more impressive, are the unfailing touch with reality, the consciousness of the preacher's high vocation, and the conviction, to use the words of Newman, that 'the supreme motive of the preacher is the salvation of the hearer.'

The modern situation, with its changed atmosphere and outlook, is here poignantly portrayed, as in Dr. Sockman's contribution and elsewhere, but over against it all there is the vivid realization of the power of Christ to save and uplift men. The most moving paper, in many respects, is that by Mr. Poling, reminding us of 'Down in Water Street.' It is a transcript from life, preaching Methodism in action at its best.

It is refreshing to find a working minister not

only with a comprehensive knowledge of literature and an acute perception of its various values, but also with the power to communicate to his readers his own cultured enthusiasm. We can safely say all this, and more, of Dr. Lynn H. Hough, minister of the American Presbyterian Church at Montreal. His book, *The Artist and the Critic* (Abingdon Press; \$1.50), is delightful from beginning to end. It is written with relish and almost abandon, as if Dr. Hough immensely enjoyed the job, and this enjoyment is infectious. Briefly stated, the content of the book is as follows: Euripides is taken as the typical artist. We are told all about him and his environment, and we are led on to consider the perspective and spirit of the artist in many other great works. Lucian is taken as the typical critic, and, when he is sufficiently expounded, we have the main points illuminated similarly by other writers. Finally, the fusion of artist and critic is found in Dante, and all lovers of Dante will thank Dr. Hough for his chapters on the conditions that limited him and the use he made of them.

There has been of late a good deal of excellent writing on the ministry of the Holy Spirit, so much so that one wonders at the complaint made by the Rev. Raymond Calkins in his book, *The Holy Spirit* (Abingdon Press; \$1.50), that the subject has been greatly neglected. Perhaps he is thinking of his own country. In any case Mr. Calkins has done his best to supply the lack, and it is a good best. His book is not theology; nor is it simply devotion. There is a great deal of sound thinking in it, and there is also an earnestness which amounts sometimes to passion. The writer is convinced that what the Church needs, and what the individual needs, is a baptism of the Spirit, and few will question his conviction. But this point is pressed on us in this book in so practical a fashion and with such a flame of urgency that it becomes a challenge to our faith.

The 'St. Louis Post-Dispatch' is an American journal which has celebrated its jubilee by the publication of a number of essays by well-known writers representative of all nations and all points of view. These have been collected and published under the title *The Drift of Civilization* (Allen & Unwin; 7s. 6d. net). The list of contributors includes Maxime Gorky, Bertrand Russell, J. B. S. Haldane, Dr. Einstein, Sir Philip Gibbs, Dean Inge, H. G. Wells, and Stephen Leacock, to name only the most familiar. Their papers are supposed to

summarize what (as they believe) is the drift of things in various regions of thought and activity. Some of the writers take their task seriously, like Dr. Einstein, who gives us a glimpse of 'The New Physics,' and M. M. A. Nexö, an ardent Communist who already sees Satan (the bourgeois society) fallen as lightning from heaven. Others, like Dean Inge, ramble along pleasantly about things in general, or, like Gorky, apparently ignore their instructions and write reminiscently. One of the most interesting essays is that by Sir Philip Gibbs, who reveals the fact that just before the Armistice Britain and America had got ready a form of attack which would have practically blotted out the German armies and made Hell of some of their towns. On the whole the essays in this book are interesting, and even, in a few cases, of considerable value.

What is the aim of education? This question is as old as man, at least as old as Solomon and Plato, and this is the question which Professor William C. Bower attempts to answer in *Character through Creative Experience* (Cambridge University Press; 11s. 6d. net). In America, with its mixture of races and cultures, the question is poignant and pressing, and any attempt to answer it seriously is praiseworthy. On a superficial reading one might think that the present author had delivered himself over to the hands of the Behaviourists, for we read about the necessity of knowing everything about the pupil, from his simple reflexes to the condition of his endocrine glands. Undoubtedly all this is important, as the old tag '*mens sana in corpore sano*' recognized long ago, but the writer well reminds us, both in the title and in the body of his volume, that the development of character is the aim of the educationist and, indeed, of all good men, and that character is more than these. The writer's behaviourism is not mechanistic but voluntaristic. If we might pass a mild judgment on the method of the writer it would be to the effect that he delights too much in distinctions, and the multiplying of points, like the old Puritan preachers, though he is far from being a Puritan.

What, then, is character? Can we get our ideals simply by analysing the actualities of experience, or do we need to bring them to bear upon experience in a creative and purifying way? Where is this place of ideals, as Plato would call it? The author tells us of the force of environment, and at times gives the impression that all experience is due to that, but just at this very point he is in danger of forgetting his own aim. Personalities

are greater than their environment and act teleologically on their surroundings.

His chapter on Religion is somewhat disappointing, nor is it easy for us to believe, in spite of his long historical disquisition on the development of religion, that religion is just the resultant of climate and soil. Surely the writer here is unduly under the influence of the Historicism and Comparative Religionism now associated with the University of Chicago. This *cuius regio eius religio* point of view must be transcended, and at times, though not steadily and wholly, the author does this, and it is just at these points that he is most persuasive.

Life's Greatest Victory, by the Rev. H. W. Morrow, D.D. (James Clarke; 5s. net), contains a series of twenty-one addresses to young men and women. They are brief and pointed, the titles in many cases are happily chosen, and there is a considerable wealth of illustration.

The Outcast Christ, by the Rev. E. H. Phillips, M.A. (James Clarke; 5s. net), is a careful and detailed study of the records dealing with the trial, death, and resurrection of Jesus. The author, who was a chaplain in Palestine during the War, has used his local knowledge to good account, and has supplemented it by a thoughtful reading of the relevant literature, including the Apocryphal writings. He lays stress on the hypothesis that Jesus, in consequence of excommunication by the Sanhedrin, became One whom it was unlawful to name. 'We comprehend the complete silence of the Jewish historians of His own day. When He became finally excommunicate, the closing words of His condemnation would be uttered by all present: "There is no Jesus of Nazareth. There never was. There never will be."' This is a book which is full of interesting suggestions, especially in regard to the Resurrection, and it will repay the attentive reader.

Mercy and Faithfulness: Studies in the Gospel according to St. John, by the Rev. Thomas Gregory, D.D., Minister-emeritus of St. Columba Church, Kilmacolm (James Clarke; 5s. net), is a charming and uplifting book. The author is a clergyman of the Church of Scotland who was known to a previous generation much better than to this. He was a noted scholar, with a cultured and delicate mind, and it is pleasant to have this fruit of his ministry. The book is really an exposition of the Fourth Gospel, paragraph by paragraph, but in a broad and suggestive fashion. The main truth in

each section is disentangled and illustrated, and in the treatment there is an unctious of the true kind.

Mr. Abraham I. Schechter, Ph.D., offers a series of learned *Studies in Jewish Liturgy* (Dropsie College, Philadelphia; \$2.00) based on a unique MS. entitled 'Seder Hibbur Berakot' (Order of a Collection of Benedictions), which contains scores of very old prayers, *piyyutim* and *selihot*, whose authors are unknown. In the first part Dr. Schechter discusses the origin of this Seder and comes to the conclusion that it was compiled by Menahem b. Solomon in the first half of the twelfth century, and that it represents in the main the Palestinian Ritual which had become the fixed ritual of the Italian Jews. An Italian atmosphere pervades the MS. throughout: till the latter part of the ninth century, Palestinian influence upon Italy was strong, and the Italian Jews looked towards Palestine for spiritual comfort and instruction. Despite the preponderatingly Palestinian nature of the Italian rite, however, the Seder not unnaturally reveals traces of Babylonian elements, introduced doubtless by Babylonian Jews who had migrated to Palestine and who naturally influenced the usages of the synagogue. The second part of the book contains the text of and notes on some of the prayers, for example, morning and evening prayers, grace after meals; and there are several photographs of facsimile pages of the MS.

In connexion with the fifteen hundredth anniversary of St. Augustine's death, the mind of Christendom naturally turns to the teachings and spiritual experiences of one who is confessedly the greatest Christian thinker since St. Paul. A book which in the circumstances is very opportune and which deserves a warm welcome is *St. Augustine's Conversion*, by the Rev. W. J. Sparrow Simpson, D.D. (S.P.C.K.; 10s. 6d. net). The term 'conversion' is here used in a somewhat wide sense to include the whole of Augustine's spiritual development to the time of his ordination. This development 'has not only a historic and a human value, but is also at the same time a very real guide and encouragement amid the perplexities of the modern mind. It reminds us how ancient many a problem is which our century has a curious habit of regarding as something quite original and new.' Dr. Sparrow Simpson is evidently a close and sympathetic student of St. Augustine's works. He traces with great patience and insight the various steps by which Augustine passed through Manichæism and

scepticism to Neo-Platonism and thence to a settled Christian faith. Bearing in mind that the 'Confessions' were not written till thirteen years after the spiritual crisis, Dr. Simpson has gathered from Augustine's earlier works all references bearing upon his spiritual history, and from these more nearly contemporary sources has supplemented and to some extent corrected the 'Confessions.' The author is to be congratulated on a fine piece of work which combines in a rare degree sound scholarship with warm Christian feeling.

For the ordinary reader *Christian Dhyāna* is a confusing little book, and, worse than that, he has the feeling that it is made so quite unnecessarily. Yet there are reasons that explain this. The little volume (S.P.C.K.; 2s. 6d. net) arose thus. Mr. Verrier Elwin at the close of a lecture on Christian Mysticism heard the Brahmin chairman remark that 'he was delighted to find *even in Christianity* an interest in the method and philosophy of prayer.' This stung him; and as a result he has issued, chiefly for Indian minds, his study of that fine old mystic classic, 'The Cloud of Unknowing.' One wishes it all success in its primary object. But it is not likely to have a large welcome in the West. For one thing, the Cloud is not meant for every one; there are those who would find its atmosphere, its conception and practice of prayer, stuffy and unaired beyond bearing—a hot-house kind of place. For another, in the attempt to reach the Indian mind the pages are thickly bestrewn with Indian terms—quite simple for any one with any knowledge in those fields, but irritating and repelling to those who have not. And, indeed, even keeping that first end in view, the thing is overdone, a little childish. And for a third, things are so overlaid by continual Indian parallels and similarities, and so on, that what the Cloud itself stands for is not always easily followed.

The very title is not likely to lure Western readers. *Dhyāna* is defined by Bālaḍeva as 'thinking on one subject continuously, without the inrush of ideas incongruous with the subject and thought.' 'Christian Dhyāna therefore,' says Mr. Elwin, 'will be the steady flow of loving attention to God of a soul which is "in Christ," whose environment and life is Christ.'

Biblical chronology has a curious fascination for certain minds, and the Rev. A. T. Richardson has fallen under the spell of it. Accepting the accuracy of the Biblical statements, he fills the pages of his

Bible Chronology (E. & F. N. Spon ; 12s. 6d. net) with dated events—the recorded dates, which occupy the left-hand column, ranging from 1880 B.C. to 513 B.C. By reckoning 100 moon-shanahs (as he calls them) as = 8·085 tropical years, he reduces the years of Abraham's predecessors to reasonable dimensions. Methuselah, for example, dies, aged 78, in 1695 B.C.; Noah dies, aged 77, in 1666. From Gn 11²⁷ the ages are given in 'season-shanahs.' On this scheme, Abram, who was born in 1485, 'reigned' from 1448 to 1398 B.C. The book displays much ingenuity, which, we fear, will not greatly advance the cause of Biblical chronology.

Fundamentalism in this country is neither so rare nor so negligible as many people imagine. Those who are in touch with youth know that it is quite common among those who might be supposed to be opposed to its standpoint. In all probability this is due partly to misunderstanding and partly to ignorance. In either case the need of enlightenment is urgent. And this could hardly be more effectively given than it is in *Letters to a Fundamentalist*, by Mr. Percy Austin, B.A., with a foreword by Principal Garvie (S.C.M.; 6s. net). Mr. Austin writes to a friend who is a fundamentalist, and in his letters discusses all sorts of points that arise from his friend's position and that are at issue between the two attitudes. The whole gamut is here—science and the Bible, 'apparent contradictions,' the nature of prophecy, inspiration and authority. The author is not a modernist in the extreme sense. He claims to be both a fundamentalist (in the true sense) and a modernist (in the better sense), and he is always reasonable, reverent, and pointed. There is hardly a difficulty that has been raised in connexion with the Bible that is not faced and discussed here. And we could not well imagine anything better calculated to disarm and to instruct any one who is suspicious of the modern attitude to the Bible, and yet has anything of an open mind.

Among Christian people there is to-day a strong desire to see Christian standards applied in business and in industrial organization. There are many who will roundly say (as one speaker did say at a

conference on the subject), 'You cannot live a Christian life within the [present] system.' Is that true? And if so, are Christian standards to go? Or is the present system to go? The Christian Social Council, in its Research Section, has been investigating the subject, and the result of its provisional inquiries has been published in a volume, *The Just Price*, containing essays by various writers, and edited by Mr. V. A. Demant, B.Litt., B.Sc. (S.C.M.; 4s. 6d. net). The starting-point of the inquiry was the mediæval doctrine of the 'Just Price' and its application in that age, and the goal was the possibility of an equivalent to-day. It is obvious that the simpler conditions of mediæval life made the fixing of a just price comparatively simple. The conditions to-day are totally different, more complicated, and made specially formidable by the altered value of money and the whole financial organization. So that the problem is really whether the conception of justice behind the mediæval 'Just Price' can be translated into a modern equivalent. The whole situation is discussed in these essays with immense ability by writers who not only have the Christian standpoint, but who face their problem in a sane spirit and with a wide knowledge of what it implies.

St. Augustine, by Eleanor McDougall, D.Litt. (S.C.M.; 3s. 6d. net), while it gives a sufficient outline of the great Christian thinker, is mainly a study of his personal religion. This is done with great reverence and sympathy. It is perhaps natural that the writer, whose life-work is in Madras, should have Indian thought constantly present to her mind. At the same time it seems unfortunate that she should have made such large use of the term *bhakti* in speaking of Augustine's devotion to God. To many readers the term will be meaningless, and in itself it is open to objection from its association with pantheism. Augustine was no pantheist any more than St. Paul, and it is not helpful to speak of the one as 'the Bhakta of Christ,' or of the other as 'that chief of bhaktas.' The book, however, is extremely readable, and, besides painting a sketch of Augustine's time, it succeeds in bringing the lovable and Christian side of the man into clear view.

A Study in 1 Corinthians xv.

BY THE REVEREND CANON BINDLEY, D.D., DENTON, NORFOLK.

THIS doctrinal section, nearly at the close of St. Paul's letter, was not written, so far as appears, in answer to any question propounded in the letter brought to the Apostle by the Corinthian delegates, such as called forth the passages in chapters 7-14. It was evoked most probably by some reports that had reached St. Paul about the doubts that were felt by some of the Corinthian Christians as to a general resurrection—doubts arising apparently from grossly materialistic views as to the nature of the resurrection body.

I. The first seven verses give us a glimpse into the customary course of teaching which the Apostle pursued in his missionary labours. The atoning death of Christ, followed by His Resurrection on the third day, formed some of the essentials of his preaching; and these keynotes of doctrine the Corinthian Christians all held. Belief in *Christ's* resurrection was their firm faith. And so, the opening phrases, which are so often wrongly taken to be formal proofs of Christ's resurrection, are merely reminders of the ABC of the Christian faith which St. Paul had impressed upon his converts. He was not in the least concerned to prove to them that Christ had risen: that was unnecessary. His object was to convict the dubious ones of an absurd fallacy in their logic. They believed that Christ had risen, and yet maintained, in opposition to this particular affirmative, the universal negative proposition that 'a resurrection of dead men is impossible.' They admitted the resurrection of Christ, but looked upon it as of such unique character as to yield no basis for deduction as to other resurrections.

In a series of short terse dilemmas the Apostle points out the miserable position into which their logical fallacy led them and left them. It robbed them of their foundation belief and of all the benefits of the salvation that Christ had brought; and it rendered nugatory such practices as 'baptism for the dead,' and cut at the root of all Christian self-sacrifice. How could they be so short-sighted as to allow the first-fruits but deny the harvest which the first-fruits implied? They forgot that everything, including death, was to be subdued by Christ; and that in Him were incorporated His followers, the members of His Body. Let them beware of being led astray, by those who denied a future resurrection, into a maze of corrupt

or careless living. Doctrinal error would certainly issue in moral decline.

This brief summary, I think, covers the first thirty-four verses of the chapter. But a few points in the course of the argument need a little closer notice.

Vv.^{3, 4, 5} have all the appearance of being a quotation from an early official formula of what the Apostle calls the 'first or foundation principles' of Christian belief:

'Christ died for our sins according to the Scriptures,
And was buried,
And was raised on the third day according to the Scriptures,
And he appeared to Kephaz, then to the twelve . . .'

Now what Scriptures are referred to in accordance with which Christ died for our sins and rose again the third day? Would that St. Luke had preserved for us the Lord's own exegesis of the Sacred Writings when, beginning from Moses, and from all the Prophets, He interpreted (*διερμήνευσεν*) to them in all the Scriptures the things concerning Himself (Lk 24²⁷). We should have had the deepest of all 'hermeneutics' for our enlightenment and guidance. Our Lord is apparently made to include 'the third day' in O.T. prophecy (Lk 24⁴⁶), and it is remarkable that so slight a detail should have been noted and have riveted itself into the Creeds.

The question arises, Ought we to restrict the phrase 'according to the Scriptures' to the fact of the Resurrection only, or extend it to the exact day of the event—the third day? In the first case, if we restrict it only to the *fact* of the Resurrection, we can supply Scripture proof from that employed by St. Peter on the Day of Pentecost from Ps 16—'Thou wilt not leave my soul in Hades, nor suffer thy holy one to see corruption.' And he may have used this text on the authority of the Risen Lord Himself. But if Scripture proof is demanded for 'the third day,' it may be possible to elicit some light from those details of the Passover ceremonial which were at the moment engrossing the mind of the Apostle.

It was just before the Passover of the year 56

when St. Paul at Ephesus received the Corinthian letter and deputation. When he replied, the Passover had come, with its accompanying presentation of the first-fruits 'on the morrow after the sabbath' (Lv 23⁹⁻²¹); and the Apostle's heart and thoughts were full of the Scriptures which dealt with that festival, and were concentrated on the True Paschal Lamb, who, as the First-fruits, had fulfilled in every particular all that was foreshadowed in the ancient ritual. References palpable and patent, as well as allusive and inferentially latent, abound throughout the Epistle. 'Our Passover is sacrificed for us—Christ.' 'A little leaven leaveneth the whole lump.' 'Purge out the old leaven, and keep festival with the unleavened bread of sincerity and truth.' He refers to the Passage of the Red Sea, which was a Passover theme; and, above all, names Christ as the 'First-fruits.' And there, I think, we arrive at the point of the emphasis laid upon 'the third day'; for the passage in Leviticus particularizes the importance of the first-fruits being presented 'on the morrow after the sabbath,' that is, on the third day after the Passover, and therefore on the first day of the week. (So Professor Bacon, *Expositor*, December 1923.)

Is it not curious that in the list of Resurrection appearances there is no reference to the appearances to the women on Easter morning? We are accustomed to envisage the story of the Resurrection from the women's statements in the Synoptists, whereas we probably ought to take it from the official account communicated to St. Paul, reproduced by him in his preaching to the Corinthians, and again reiterated in this—the very first documentary evidence of the Resurrection that we possess—where we see that he did not adduce the women's testimony at all. His list of appearances is not perhaps meant to be exhaustive, but he mentions six important cases, perhaps as being more easily verified and of unimpeachable trustworthiness, or perhaps because the women's various stories were not known or not officially recorded. At any rate his story is not the Jerusalem story, but probably the Antiochene.

In v.²² the phrase 'as in Adam all die, so also in the Christ shall all be made alive,' implies that St. Paul believed the 'Adam' in the Creation stories in Genesis to be an historical personage; but the ambiguous meaning of the Hebrew word, which may be either a proper or a common noun, leaves it open for us to understand the 'Adam' as denoting man in his lower physical nature as one of the animal creation upon whom death passes, as distinct from the spiritual side of man's personality

which constitutes the higher supernatural aspect of man as a child of God.

In vv.²³⁻²⁴ we get the Pauline view of a Millennium, which approximates closely to some of the current Jewish apocalyptic beliefs. A universal resurrection is contemplated; but there are various stages in its accomplishment. Each rises in his own order or troop (*τάγμα*). First, there is the resurrection of Christ. That was a matter of history. He was the first-fruits of a harvest to follow, the 'firstborn from the dead' (Col 1¹⁸). Then, after an interval of uncertain length, the resurrection of those who are Christ's at His coming. Then, finally, after the reign of Christ on earth which is occupied with the destruction of all that is opposed to God, the abolition of death. The future age begins at the close of this reign of Christ, when the kingdom is delivered over to the Father.

Three points emerge here. First, a question of translation. Is *τὸ τέλος* a noun or an adverb? It cannot be a noun. 'Then cometh the end,' as A.V. and R.V. take it, supplying the verb 'cometh.' It was not even the beginning of the end, for the beginning of the end is Christ's Coming, the Parousia. Nor is it the absolute end, for St. Paul goes on to speak of a further event after the abolition of death, namely, the subjection of the Son to the Father—an idea which finds only occasional expression in the New Testament. *τὸ τέλος* must therefore be an adverb, as in 1 P 3⁸, and be translated 'finally.' Then the passage will run quite intelligibly like this:

'Every one in his own order: Christ as first-fruits: next, those who are Christ's at his coming: then, finally . . . the last enemy shall be destroyed, Death.'

It is one long sentence with two parentheses in the middle of it, quite in Pauline style. All that is necessary is to alter the punctuation, and to substitute 'at' for the supposititious 'cometh' in our versions. [So Professor Burkitt, *J.T.S.*, July 1916.] Then the whole would now run in our versions: 'Christ the first-fruits: then they that are Christ's at his coming: then at the end—when he shall deliver up the kingdom to God, even the Father, when he shall have abolished all rule and all authority and power—for he must reign till he hath put all his enemies under his feet—the last enemy shall be abolished, Death.'

The second point is this. If a universal resurrection is implied in v.²², and if the Resurrection at Christ's Coming is limited to those who are His,

then there must be a later resurrection in *their* order of those who are *not* His, the unbelievers, before the final consummation of all things. St. Paul did believe in a resurrection of the wicked as well as of the righteous, if his speech before Felix is correctly reported in Ac 24¹⁵—‘that there shall be a resurrection both of the just and unjust.’ But the ordinary Jewish belief was that resurrection was a privilege reserved for the righteous. And that belief is perhaps reflected in the phrase which St. Paul uses in Ph 3¹¹, ‘If by any means I may attain to the resurrection from the dead’—it was a reward, not a necessity.

The third point is this. The reign of the Messiah was not itself the future age, but the introduction to it, and the resurrection of the just takes place at the beginning of this reign. In 2 Es 7²⁸ the duration of this reign is put at 400 years; in other accounts it is fixed at 40 or 600, or 1000 or 2000 years. The period of 1000 is adopted by St. John in the Apocalypse (20^{4f.}), where we find again exactly the same three stages: first, the Millennium of 1000 years; then, the second resurrection, that is, of the wicked; and thirdly, the destruction of death.

In v.²⁹ we come to the *crux interpretum*—‘those who are baptized for the dead.’ The point of the argument is quite plain. Baptism presupposes a resurrection. If the future resurrection is a mistake, then the sacrament is a farce. But if the argument is clear and unequivocal, the exact custom referred to is most obscure. The early Greek Fathers understood it of ordinary Christian baptism. Others, mostly Western and modern commentators, explain it either of vicarious Christian baptism of living proxies for deceased relatives, or of converts led to baptism out of affection for deceased Christian friends. That the idea of vicarious lustrations for the dead was not alien to Jewish thought is proved by the action of Judas Maccabæus recorded in 2 Mac 12^{38f.} where a sacrifice or sin-offering was offered on behalf of those who had died when ceremonially unclean, with a view to their resurrection. ‘For if he were not expecting that they that had fallen would rise again, it were superfluous and idle to pray for the dead.’ The whole passage is worth study.

And then in v.³² comes the surprising suggestion that if the Apostle exposed himself to an almost certain death by becoming a beast-fighter in the arena at Ephesus, there would be nothing to be gained by his doing so, if there were no future life. This, I take it, is an imaginary supposition, for as a Roman citizen St. Paul could not be subjected

to such an ordeal. That is the objection to taking the illustration literally; though we all know the charming story of St. Paul and the baptized lion in the arena at Ephesus—a bit of second-century fanciful embroidery on this very passage. But there is just the possibility that there had really been some incident, to which we have no further clue, which gave point to this particular illustration. *Karà ánthropōn* means ‘as men do,’ with merely human motives, seeking applause, money, or release from incarceration.

II. Let us now turn to the second part of the chapter, which deals with the nature of the resurrection body. Obviously the objectors whom St. Paul answers had been led to their denial of the general resurrection by a curious materialism in their view of the resurrection body. Two points puzzled them—the manner of the resurrection, and the kind of body the raised ones would bear. ‘How are the dead raised, and with what manner of body do they come?’ St. Paul’s answer is drawn from simple analogies in Nature. The seed, which even the objector himself sows, perishes as to its outward husk, in order to let the germ of life within it clothe itself with a new organism, which retains a principle of identity with, even though it differs externally from, the original seed. The *πῶς*, the ‘How,’ is thus answered by every analogy that we see around us. But what manner of body? *ποίῳ σώματι*; St. Paul reminds them that there are diversities of bodies of every kind already existing, in form and rank and quality and beauty and glory, in things terrestrial and things celestial, and the immense variety of these is accepted as quite natural because each is determined by God in its own order and proper sphere. Why, then, should there be any difficulty in the conception of a *spiritual* body fitted for a spiritual sphere? God will give to the raised ones spiritual organisms adapted to their new environment. ‘What manner of body?’ Certainly not a perishable body of flesh and blood. The psychic body which we wear here will be exchanged for the pneumatic body which we shall wear hereafter. But the psychic body comes first: it is, as it were, the scaffolding by means of which the pneumatic body is built. And as assuredly there is a psychic body, so equally assuredly is there a pneumatic body for each of us. The one is of the earth, the other is of heaven. And as we have borne the *eikon* or outward semblance of the earthy, so shall we hereafter bear the *eikon* of the heavenly.

Personality as we know it consists in a union of soul and body; and, if that personality is to

continue through death, it must still consist of soul and body; for the body is an essential element of human personality. But the spiritual body will differ from the natural body as much as the butterfly differs from the grub: it will be more glorious, a 'body of glory,' because adapted to its environment of glory. The *σῶμα* in St. Paul's view is the organ of personal consciousness which survives the change or dissolution of the outward fashion or *σχῆμα*. The *σῶμα*, for instance, one might say, of the insect is preserved through the three changes of its *σχῆμα* or *εἰκὼν* as caterpillar, chrysalis, butterfly.

It is essential for the understanding of St. Paul's argument to grasp the fact that he is not speaking of a dead corpse and its quasi-material revival or resuscitation. That is the very error that he was combating. He is speaking of the resurrection of those whom we call the dead. And he does not say, 'The dead body is sown in corruption and raised in glory.' He is not thinking of burial at all: burial is not within the purview of his argument. The verbs are impersonal. He says *σπείρεται*, 'There is a sowing in corruption,' and *ἐγείρεται*, 'there is a raising in glory.' And the sowing is not the burial of the dead body, but the planting of our individual lives here on earth. This is absolutely clear: because the order in St. Paul's mind is sowing, death, resurrection; whereas the common view that he is thinking of burial would demand the order death, sowing, resurrection. The sowing, as in the case of the seed, must precede the death, not follow it. There would be no use in sowing dead seed: it is living seeds that must be sown. The analogy demands that we should be sown living, not dead; and that implies our being sown on this earth. Neither seeds sown *in* the earth, nor we sown *on* the earth perish in the dissolution of death. The idea of our life on this earth being a sowing was a familiar one. It underlies the commonest expression of a man's posterity as his seed, and finds explicit statement in 2 Es 5⁴⁸, where God says, 'I have given the womb of the earth to those that be sown therein in their several generations.'

The corruption, dishonour, weakness, *φθορά*, *ἀτιμία*, *ἀσθενεία*, in which our individual lives are sown, represent our subjection to corruption, sufferings, and death—'the weakness of our mortal nature,' and correspond with the Apostle's phrase in Ph 3²⁸, 'the body of our humiliation.' Further, it would be incongruous to speak of a dead corpse, *πτῶμα*, as a *σῶμα ψυχικόν*; yet he says 'there is a sowing of a psychic body.' Nor should we speak of a corpse as 'weak.'

A few subsidiary matters remain.

In vv.^{51, 52} (as in 1 Th 4¹⁵) St. Paul contemplates himself as amongst those who will be alive at Christ's Coming. 'We shall not all sleep, but we shall all be changed.' That is to say, he believed that the *ἐπιφάνεια* or *παρουσία* would come in his own lifetime, and in that of the majority of his readers. Hence, to meet any possible objection or question as to what kind of bodies those still living on earth at that solemn crisis would wear when the dead were raised, he asserts that *all* must undergo the same change—the dissolution of what is mortal, and the assumption of the body of glory. He describes this change from the body of our humiliation to the body of glory in Ph 3²¹ as a 'refashioning' or change of the outer *σχῆμα*; but how this transformation is effected, he does not tell us, any more than he attempts a description of the pneumatic body. It is probably beyond our present comprehension.

We notice that this conception of the necessity for a transformation of the earthly body before it can inherit immortality is a new element in Pauline thought. In 1 Th 4¹⁷ no change in the body was contemplated. Apparently those who were alive at the Parousia would, *just as they were*, join the Lord in the air. This idea finds no place here. Flesh and blood cannot inherit the Kingdom of God. This corruptible *must* put on incorruption.

Again, nowhere does St. Paul define what he understood by the dead 'sleeping.' It was a purely Jewish idea, yet apparently the O.T. notion of a realm of the dead in Sheol finds no echo in St. Paul's writings. He never uses the word Hades. Did he sometimes think of the dead as awaiting in sleep the summons to awake and undergo the necessary change? In 2 Co 5²¹ he expresses the belief that the dead pass immediately into the presence of Christ; and also that the spiritual body is actually existent now and ready to be assumed at the moment of death. I imagine that the fact is that no symbolic language can fully and completely portray the spiritual world. Now one aspect of the change is dwelt upon, and now another, and these are not consistent or rationally coherent. Whatever our views may be of death and of the future life, we may be sure that they are utterly inadequate. We cannot fix even the main characteristics of the life of the world to come.

I have one other remark to make. St. Paul does not appeal to the Appearances of the Risen Christ as helping his readers to form an idea of the nature of the resurrection body. And the reason, I think, is this. The accounts in the Gospels are so mysteri-

ously difficult to harmonize that it is almost impossible to form any coherent view of the nature of our Lord's Body after His Resurrection. We cannot envisage in what kind of a body He chose to appear and disappear, and disguise His form, and eat material food 'before' and 'with' His disciples. So that the appearances of the Risen Lord as depicted in the Gospels are least helpful in aiding us to think of our own future spiritual bodies. But suppose that our Lord, instead of being buried as a Jew, had been cremated as a Roman or a Greek—and very many of the bodies of martyrs of all ages have been burned before or after death without involving the smallest doubt as to their future resurrection—there could have arisen no disputes about the empty tomb or the nature of His resurrection body. Yet His resurrection, His victory over death, His continued life in exaltation, would

have been equally assured, at any rate to St. Paul, by the revelation that came to him on the Damascus road, and which turned the superbly orthodox Pharisee into a captive slave at the chariot wheels of His Lord and Master. That the flesh and blood material of our Lord's body evanescenced, evaporated, sublimated, without undergoing corruption in the tomb is an old theory which was revived some time ago by Latham in his book called *The Risen Master*. This thought may possibly throw light upon St. Paul's statement about all undergoing change, whether dead or alive, at the Coming. But in our case the body does undergo dissolution and corruption; and that shows that the outer husk of our personal individuality here is only an *instrumentum* or temporary mode of expression of our true self, which lives on through and after the experience of death.

National Contributions to Biblical Science.

IV. The Contribution of Germany to Church History: Ancient Church and Reformation.

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II.

NEXT to the history of the Ancient Church, German scholars have eminently contributed to the knowledge of that of the Reformation. The Germans, indeed, claim the Reformation as a German product, and this claim, though not above criticism, is substantially justified by the dominating influence exercised by Luther on the initiation and early development of the movement in Germany and other lands. One is almost snowed under by the mass of the historical literature which has appeared during the last half-century and continues to appear in endless volume, and in which the Germans give unstinted scope to their rage for literary production (*Arbeitswut*). For anything like an adequate account of it in English I may refer the student to the footnotes of my *Luther and the Reformation*, or to the extensive German bibliography of Wolf (*Quellenkunde der deutschen Reformationsgeschichte*, 1915-23).¹ Corporations and indi-

viduals have alike contributed to elucidate this complex movement. As the result of this activity the number of publications in the form of editions of sources or of monographs can only be described as legion. This productivity has been fostered by the *Verein für Reformationsgeschichte*, whose organ is the *Archiv für Ref. geschichte*. Very meritorious is the interest shown in this historic research by the Prussian Government through its Commission for the investigation of the history of the Reformation and the Counter Reformation, whose foundation is a valuable fruit of the Quatercentenary of the Reformation in 1917. To this celebration the Luther Society (*Luthergesellschaft*), whose organs are the *Lutherjahrbuch* and the *Luther Quarterley*, also owes its existence. For the study of the subject from the Roman Catholic point of view there is the *Historical Studies and Texts* series since 1906, which are supplemented by the numerous publications of the *Görresgesellschaft*.

Among general collections of the utmost value it must suffice to mention the *Deutsche Reichstagsakten* still in course of publication; the series of

¹ Kawerau has published a chronological list of Luther's works in particular, *Verein für Reformationsgeschichte*, No. 129, 2nd ed., 1929. See also Albrecht, *Theol. Stud. u. Krit.*, 1926.

Nuntiatur-berichte, containing the Reports of the papal nuncios from Germany to the Vatican; the publications of the Prussian Historical Institut at Rome, which include a number of contributions to Reformation history; the voluminous and standard Weimar edition of Luther's works, still unfinished, and the latest collection of his vast correspondence begun by Enders and continued by Kawerau and others, and containing many letters of Luther's correspondents, including those of the Electors Frederick, John, and John Frederick of Saxony. Those of Melancthon fill a large number of volumes of the 'Corpus Reformatorum.' The *Corpus Catholicorum* in course of publication furnishes competent editions of the works of Luther's opponents, and the enormous collection of documents relative to the Council of Trent has, in part, been published by the *Görresgesellschaft*. The correspondence of Luther's foremost antagonist among the German princes, Duke George of Saxony, has been edited by Gess, that of his patron, the Landgrave Philip of Hesse, by Lenz. Among the smaller collections of documents those of Löscher (*Reformations-Acta*, 1517-19), Förstemann (*Urkundenbuch*), and Balan (*Monumenta*) are useful. Similarly the more recent ones of Scheel (*Documente zu Luther's Entwicklung bis 1517*, 1929) and Köhler on the Indulgence controversy.

A foremost place among the general surveys of German Reformation history must still be assigned to Ranke's *Deutsche Geschichte* in the edition of the German Academy (1925-26), though the editors could have improved it by more copious critical notes in the light of more recent research. Bezold's *Geschichte der Deutschen Reformation* (1890) is an admirable study of the subject, and the same may be said of the volume of K. Müller's *Kirchengeschichte*, and that of Hermelink in the *Handbuch der K.G.*, edited by Krüger (1929), which treat of the Reformation. Other recent surveys are Brieger's *Reformation* (1914), Pflugk-Hartung's *Im Morgenrot der Reformation* (1926), Brandt's *Deutsche Reformation und Gegenreformation* (1927), Kaser's *Zeitalter der Reformation und Gegenreformation* (1922). The concise exposition of the general causes of the Reformation given by von Below in *Die Ursachen der Reformation* is a counter-blast to Troeltsch's *Bedeutung des Protestantismus* (1911), and other works on the general movement.

From the Roman Catholic point of view the movement is more or less elucidated in Pastor's *History of the Popes*, which is the fruit of the study of the contents of ecclesiastical archives in Germany and Italy, though its objectivity is open to question.

Far more vulnerable from this point of view is Janssen's *Geschichte des Deutschen Volkes*, which is written in a too partisan spirit to be generally relied on, though it contains a mass of illuminating material drawn from the sources.

German research in the ecclesiastical history of the sixteenth century concentrates largely on the life and work of Luther as a Reformer. It derived a stimulus from the Quatercentenary of his birth in 1883, and from the discovery of new material, especially the early lectures on the Psalms, Romans, and Hebrews, the notes on Augustine and some of the Schoolmen, etc. It was strengthened by Denifle's violent attack on the Reformer in his *Luther und Lutherthum*, which produced a heavy crop of Protestant vindications. Denifle's thesis is that Luther's breach with the mediæval Church and papacy was the result of a moral collapse, not of genuine religious experience, and he reviews his reforming activity largely in the light of this perverse assumption. The attack showed, however, weak points in the previous Protestant literature on Luther and the Lutheran movement, especially the lack of an adequate knowledge of the Scholastic Theology on the part of Protestant writers. It led to a more intensive study of the later Scholasticism in which Luther was trained. Witness Seeberg's very capable review of the Scholastic Theology in his *Dogmengeschichte*, following on his monograph on *Duns Scotus* (1900). It thus contributed to a new and most fruitful period of Luther research, which during the last quarter of a century has deepened and widened our knowledge of him and the German Reformation.

Besides the biographical matter handed down by Melancthon, Mathesius, Ratzeberger, Myconius, and other contemporaries, the great mine for the history of Luther and the Reformation is the works, correspondence, and table talk of Luther himself. The standard Weimar edition from 1883 onwards has superseded its Erlangen predecessor, though some of the earlier volumes need revision, and the introductions to most of them are too exclusively devoted to bibliographical and philological matter and do not attempt an evaluation of the contents. A number of excellent selections from his works have been edited by Clemen, Borchardt, Berger, and others. Among the biographies the solid work of Köstlin, as revised by Kawerau (fifth edition, 1903) still holds the first place, though a new edition, in accordance with more recent research, would make it more serviceable. Hausrath's *Luther*, which comes next in importance, is less thorough, but more readable (new edition by v. Schubert). Berger has

attempted to depict Luther in relation to the culture of the time (*Luther in kulturgeschichtlicher Darstellung* (1895, 1921). Troeltsch rather one-sidedly estimates the man and the movement as an embodiment of the mediæval, rather than the modern spirit, in his *Soziallehren der christlichen Kirchen und Gruppen* (1912). Köhler's concise sketch (*Luther und die Deutsche Reformation*, 1917) is a model of its kind. Boehmer's *Luther in the Light of Recent Research* (1918) is a highly valuable estimate and vindication in reply to Denifle and other detractors, though there is a trace at times in this and other German works on Luther of one-sidedness. The Roman Catholic Grisar has devoted three bulky volumes to the arch-heretic of the sixteenth century, which have been translated into English. Though he writes within the limits of prescribed authority and is therefore not objective, he avoids the offensive tone of Denifle, while showing traces of his influence. A large amount of biographical literature is devoted to the elucidation of stages or phases of Luther's life. Naturally the earlier period excites the greatest interest, inasmuch as it is in the years of conflict (to circa 1530), as the emancipator of the Church from papal-mediæval domination, that Luther's work is most dramatic and formative. The partial biographers have, therefore, largely concentrated on the earlier Luther. An outstanding example of such works is O. Scheel's *Luther, von Katholicismus zur Reformation* (1916-17). More concise, but illuminative are Boehmer's *Der junge Luther* (1925), Ritter's *Luther* (1925), Oergel's *Vom jungen Luther* (1899), A. V. Müller's *Luther's Werdegang* (1920), Stracke's *Luther's grosses Selbstzeugnis* (1926), and the sketches of Neubauer, v. Schubert, Merz, von Walter. The two most recent are those of Wendorf (1930) and Siegfried, *Luther und Kant* (1930).

On the origin and development of Luther's reforming ideas the masterly essays of Holl (*Aufsätze*,⁵ 1927) are the most important contribution of recent times. Epoch-making in this connexion are Ficker's edition of the Commentary on Romans (1908 Ger. tr. of the Commentary by Eilwein, 1927), and von Schubert's edition of that on Galatians (1918). Loof's disquisition on his doctrine of Justification (*Stud. und Krit.*, 1917) is also of great value, in addition to A. Ritschl's extensive monograph on the subject. Wolf's *Staupitz und Luther* and Jeremias' *Joh. von Staupitz* are valuable for Luther's relation and indebtedness to the Vicar-General of his Order. The influence of the mediæval mystics on Luther's religious development is elucidated by Hunzinger (1906), A. V. Müller (*Luther und Tauler*, 1918), and others.

For the crucial period from 1517 to 1521, in which Luther enunciated and developed his reforming ideas in conflict with the traditional Church, the works of Kalkoff (*Entscheidungsjahre der Reformation*, 1917, and monographs on Hutten, Erasmus, and the Diet of Worms) are based on intensive research of the relative sources, though some of his conclusions have encountered considerable criticism. Special aspects are treated by a large number of writers, as in Köhler's (1895) and Kohnmeyer's (1922) expositions of Luther's epoch-making Address to the Nobility, Bauer's exposition of the new Wittenberg Theology (*Die Wittenberger Universitäts Theologie*, 1928), Brieger's *Aleander und Luther*, Ficker's *Luther als Professor* (1928), etc.

In the period succeeding the Diet of Worms the salient features are the conflict with the radical wing of the movement, represented by Carlstadt and Münzer and culminating in the Peasant Rising, the organization of the Lutheran evangelical Church, and the Anabaptist movement. On the struggle with the radical reformers Barge's *Karlstadt* (1905) is the most extensive work, though it has been subjected to sharp criticism by K. Müller and others (*Luther und Karlstadt*, 1907). See also Nik. Müller, *Die Wittenberger Bewegung* (1911). Much research has in recent years been bestowed on Th. Münzer as the protagonist of the prophetic-spiritual movement, which was influenced by mediæval mysticism. Witness the recent monographs of Zimmermann (1925), Boehmer (1922), Schulz (1928), Bloch (1922), Holl (1927), which have modified the old superficial estimate. On the Peasant Rising in relation to the Reformation fresh contributions have been made by Stolze (*Bauernkrieg und Reformation*, 1926), Althaus (*Luther's Haltung im Bauernkrieg*, 1925), Brandt (*Der grosse Bauernkrieg*, 1925), Rosenkranz (*Der Bundschuh*, 1927). For Luther's conception of the Church and its constitutional organization there is also a considerable volume of new literature as the result of the discussion of this highly controversial subject. Whilst Luther conceived of the Church as an autonomous spiritual association based on the faith of the individual Christian (the Church as the Communion of Saints), he was driven by circumstances to align it with the civil power in the work of organization. There is thus a certain inconsistency in his attitude to the State, which varies with the attitude of the State towards the Reformation movement, and this lack of a definite policy from the outset is reflected in the controversial tone of the works dealing with this subject, which have not reached anything like exact agree-

ment. Besides the general reviews in the Histories of *Kirchenrecht* (Mejer, 1869; Richter, 1851; Sohm 1892; Bredt, 1921, etc.), the discussion has been enriched by the special monographs of Rieker (1893), Kattenbusch (*Theol. Stud. und Krit.*, 1928), Rietschel (*ib.* 1906), Sohm (*Weltlicher und geistlicher Recht*, 1914), Drews (*Zeitschr. für Theol. und Kirche*, 1908), Hermelink (*Zeitschr. für Kirchen Gesch.*, 1908), Köhler (*ib.* 1917-18), Holl (*Aufsätze*, 1927), K. Müller (*Kirche, Gemeinde, und Obrigkeit nach L.*, 1910), Kohlmeyer (*Entstehung der Schrift Luther's an den Adel*, 1922, and 'Die Bedeutung der Kirche für Luther,' *Zschr. K.G.*, 1928), Meinecke ('Luther über Christliches Wesen,' *Hist. Zeitsch.*, 1920), Hashagen (*Zsch. K.G.*, 1922 and 1927), Pallas (*Kirchenregiment in Kursachsen vor der Reformation*, 1910), Althaus (*Die Gemeinde im Lutherischen Kirchengedanken*, 1929). The German territorial church constitutions of the Reformation period have been collected by Richter (*Die Evangelischen Kirchenordnungen des 16^{ten} Jahrhunderts*), and more recently by Sehling, whose work under the same title has, in part, superseded his.

In the practical task of maintaining his distinctive views against dissidents of a variety of type, Luther unfortunately resiled from the cardinal principle of toleration, which he vindicated so nobly in his early conflict with the mediæval Church and Papacy. This is rather tragically apparent in his ultimate attitude towards the Anabaptists and the Spiritual Reformers, who are to be distinguished from the earlier radicals of the Münzer type. This movement has also received an intensive study in a number of German monographs, in some of which at least a more sympathetic and objective treatment of it has become apparent, and which have largely superseded the older works of Ritschl (*Geschichte der Pietismus*, 1880), Keller (*Geschichte der Wiedertäufer*, 1880), Zur Linden (Hoffmann, 1885), Loserth (Hubmaier, 1893), Heberle (Hans Denck, 1851-55). It must suffice to mention those of Tumbült (*Die Wiedertäufer*, 1899), Troeltsch (*Soziallehren*, 1912), Sachsse (Hubmaier, 1914), Detmer (Rothmann, 1904), Geisberg (*Die Münsterischen Wiedertäufer*, 1907), Löffler (*Die W. zu Münster*, 1923), Paulus (*Protestantismus und Toleranz*, 1911), Wappler (*Die Stellung Kursachsens und Landgraf Philipp*, 1910), Nestler (*W. Bewegung in Regensburg*, 1926), von Schubert and Schönebaum (*Kommunismus*, 1919), and H. Ritschl (1923) and L. Müller (1927) on the same subject. The other type of dissent, represented by Schwenckfeld and Franck, which is often wrongly slumped with Anabaptism, has been elucidated by Hartman in his

edition of Schwenckfeld's works (1907-13), Ecke (Schwenckfeld, 1911), Grützmacher (*Wort und Geist*, 1902), Hegler (*Geist und Schrift bei Sch. Franck*, 1892), Reimann (*S. Franck als Geschichtsphilosoph*, 1921), Bornkamm (*Mystik, Spiritualismus*, 1926), Kühn (*Toleranz und Offenbarung*, 1923), Dilthey (*Weltanschauung und Analyse des Menschen seit Renaissance und Reformation*, 1914), Maier (*Der mystische Spiritualismus Weigels*, 1926), Bornkamm (*Luther und Böhme*, 1925). There is, in fact, a marked tendency at the present time to explore more intensively this interesting, but somewhat obscure field of research.

German research has been less interested in the later period of Luther and the Reformation, of which the distinctive feature is the effort to vindicate and consolidate the movement in the face of the papal and imperial attempts to suppress it. Nevertheless the literature on the movement from 1530-46 contains a number of outstanding contributions: for instance, Gussmann's monograph on the Augsburg Confession (1911) and Schirrmacher and Tschackert on the same subject. The quatercentenary of the Confession in the present year has added a goodly array to their number, for which see Liebisch's catalogue, May 1930, 41-42. Von Schubert has illuminated the political negotiations relative to it in 1529-30 in his monograph on *Bekenntnis und Bündnisbildung* (1920), von Walter in *Die Depeschen des Nic. Diepolo*, 1530 (1928). See also Winckelmann on the Schmalkald League (1892), Vetter, *Religionsverhandlungen* (1889), Pruser, *England und die Schmalkaldener* (1929), Rosenberg, *Der Kaiser und die Protestanten* (1903), Moser, *Religionsverhandlungen* (1889), Korte, *Konzilspolitik Karls V.*, 1905, Cardauns, *Geschichte der Kirchlichen Unions und Reformbestrebungen* (1910), Pastor, *Correspondenz des Card. Contarini* (1880), Dittrichs, *Contarini* (1885), Rückert, *Theologische Entwicklung Contarini's* (1926), Druffel, *Kaiser Karl V und die Römische Kurie* (1875), Hasenclever, *Politik Karls V und Landgraf Philipp* (1903), Joachim Müller, 'Politik Karls V am Trienter Konzil' (*Z.K.G.*, 1925), Brandi, *Die Augsburger Religionsfriede* (1927), Susta, *Die römische Kurie und das Konzil von Trent* (1904-14), Schmidt, *Studien zur Geschichte des Konzils von Trent*, 1925, etc. Boehmer's work on Loyola (1914) is the standard German one, and to that of Duhr on the Jesuit order belongs the same predicate.

The distinctive ideas to which Luther gave expression in his didactic and controversial writings have been minutely investigated and elucidated afresh during the last quarter of a century. Hence

the plethora of treatises on his theology which issue from the German press year by year, and in which his cardinal principles of justification by faith and the supreme authority of Scripture, the antihierarchical nature of the Church, Christian individuality and liberty have been the subject of keen and often controversial discussion. Some would deny to him the title of theologian, and there is a grain of truth in the denial in the sense that he was not a systematic thinker like Calvin or Melancthon. But as a creative genius in the sphere of religious thought he is the greatest of all the theologians since Paul and Augustine, and his lofty eminence as a theologian is evidenced by the enormous literature that has been devoted to the exposition of his religious thought. The best German review is perhaps that of Seeberg in the fourth volume of his *Dogmengeschichte* (1917), which is superior to A. v. Harnack's more general survey.

Holl's *Essays* are alike a profound contribution to the themes treated by him and symptomatic of the present reaction from the more purely cultural and ethical to the religious aspects of the Reformation. A new edition of Theodore Harnack's *Luther's Theologie* (1927) is worthy of perusal alongside Loof's *Leitfaden*. As evidence of the concentrated interest on Luther the theologian, see, for example, the recent monographs of C. Seeberg (*Luther's Theologie*, 1929), Hirsch (*Luther's Gottesanschauung*, 1918), Stange (*Studien zur Theologie Luther's*, 1928), Tschackert (*Entstehung der Lutherischen und Reformierten Kirchenlehre*, 1910), O. Ritschl (*Dogmengeschichte des Protestantismus*, 1912), Loewenich (*Luther's Theologia Crucis*, 1929), Mensching (*Glaube und Werk bei Luther*, 1926), Preuss (*Frömmigkeit Luther's*, 1917), and innumerable articles in the theological journals.

Luther's translation of the Bible, which was alike the grand fruit and force of the movement, has been discussed with ample learning in the recent works of Walther, Risch, Hirsch. On his attitude to the Scriptures, which he critically evaluated, see Scheil, *Luther's Stellung zur Heiligen Schrift* (1902), Thimme under the same title (1903), Preuss, *Die Entwicklung des Schriftsprincipals bei Luther* (1901).

Numerous monographs have appeared on Luther's collaborators in the movement. As samples, mention can only be made of Ellinger's *Melancthon*, Clemen's *Melancthon und Alex. Alesius* (1929), Diehl's *Bucer* (1904), Thiele on 'Agricola' (*Theol. Stud. und Kritiken*, 1907), Kawerau on the same Reformer under the title of *Joh. v. Eisleben* (1890), Vogt's *Bugenhausen* (1888), etc.

A voluminous literature has been produced on Humanism in relation to the Reformation, with which it was closely associated, though in some respects differing from it in spirit and purpose. Many of the evangelical Reformers had been votaries of the new culture before becoming followers of Luther, and Luther himself was influenced by it, though not so directly, and deeply appreciated it as an adjunct of religious reform. Melancthon—the Praeceptor Germaniae—is the outstanding representative of this combination of devotion to the new culture and the new cult, and the edition of his works in the *Corpus Reformatorum* is a contribution of great importance to the history of both. Fresh light has been thrown on the movement as influenced by Hutten and Erasmus and other humanists by Kalkoff, Mestwerdt (on Erasmus), Bömer (critical edition of the *Epistolae Obscurorum Virorum*, 1924), von Walter on Erasmus's conception of Religion (1906), Wernle on the Renaissance and the Reformation (1912), Ritter, 'Geschichtliche Bedeutung des Deutschen Humanismus' (*Hist. Zeitschr.*, 1923), Hermelink (*Religiöse Reformbestrebungen des Deutschen Humanismus*, 1907), etc.

German scholars have also contributed to the elucidation of the Reformation in lands outside Germany. To the German-Swiss Egli and Finsler we owe the standard edition of Zwingli's works from 1895 onwards (continued by Köhler and Farner, *Corpus Ref.*). R. Stähelin of Basle has given us the standard biography of Zwingli, C. Stähelin the *Correspondence of Æcolampadius* (1927). Köhler has published the first volume of his standard work on Luther and Zwingli (1924). Wernle has devoted the second volume of his exposition of the evangelical faith, as contained in the principal writings of the Reformers, to Zwingli (1919). Calvin, the standard edition of whose works is also contained in the *Corpus Ref.*, has similarly been the subject of recent German or German-Swiss research. Witness the publications of Lang (1909), Barth's selection of his works, *Calvinstudien*, edited by Bohatec (1909), Anrich (1928), Quervain (1926). The study of Calvin's theology and political views has produced quite a crop of treatises. On his theology, Bauke (1922), Brummer (1925), Bechmann (1926), Friethoff (1926), Riesel (1928), Wernle (1919), Wolgendorff (1916), Bergerhaus (1910). On his political teaching, Hausscherr (1923), Barm (1924), von Schubert (1923). Space permits only to mention examples of recent contributions to the Reformation History of some other lands—those of Wotschke on the Polish Reformation (1921), Arbusow for the Baltic lands

(1921), Makower and Lang for England, Doerries on Calvin and Lefèvre (*Z.K.G.*, 1925), K. Müller ('Calvin and the French Libertines,' *ib.* 1921).

In conclusion, I plead guilty to the omission, for the same reason, of many worthy contributions to the History of both the Ancient and the Reformation periods and apologize to the many scholars who have enriched the history of these periods by their

researches. As a fellow-worker in this field who knows the exacting, laboriousness of genuine historic research, and has derived much edification from the research of these scholars, I would add the expression of my appreciation of this unflagging labour, which reflects high honour on German scholarship and affords convincing proof of its distinguished ability and industry.

In the Study.

Virginibus Puerisque.

A Village Vow.

By MRS. A. THRELFALL VICKERY, PRESTWICH,
MANCHESTER.

'Pay thy vows unto the Most High.'—Ps 50¹⁴.

SOME three hundred years ago there was vowed in a tiny village a solemn vow. It came through illness, and has been kept ever since. There had been war in Europe for a generation—the Thirty Years' War, your books of history call it—and after the war, in 1633, came pestilence, or plague, like our influenza, only worse. It spread like wildfire over Bavaria. But there was one village which escaped in a marvellous way; Oberammergau was its name. The villagers had kept most careful guard from the beginning; they let no outsiders come into their village, neither would they let their villagers go into other villages. But, at last, one man evaded the quarantine. He was a labourer of Oberammergau, working in a neighbouring village. He climbed the mountain passes, crept stealthily through the tracks, and, all unsuspected, came back to his own home. Poor Caspar Schuchler! He was desperately home-sick and longed to see his wife and children; he was terribly anxious about them, and wanted to make sure that they were not in need. Alas! he had come from a plague-stricken village, and he had plague upon him; in two days he was dead, and in thirty-three days threescore-and-ten people of his own village had died too!

The few who were left were filled with dread for the future. In their distress they prayed earnestly to God; they repented of their past sins, and they made a great vow—just as Jacob did, at Bethel.

Wasn't the vow a strange one? They promised that if God would remove that plague from them

they would for ever afterwards hold a religious play, showing God's love to men, and that this Play should be shown every ten years. What happened? The plague ceased immediately, so the villagers, showing their sincerity, prepared to keep their vow, and they have kept it practically ever since.

The pastor of the village was a gifted man; he took the story of Christ's crucifixion, added a few scenes from the Old Testament, and then he set the villagers to work to perform this new Play. The custom was common in those days of performing Religious Plays, Miracle Plays, Nativity Plays, Passion Plays, much as we have Missionary Plays, Hospital Plays, Pageants, etc., nowadays, so the people were quite accustomed to that sort of thing. The pastor kept before them their vow. He made them feel that, in taking their parts, they were pleasing God, and he led them to put in their very best work, as an offering to God.

At first the Play was given in the churchyard, but that soon became too small to hold the crowds who wanted to see it. So a great theatre was built, with an open-air stage, and, as you watch the Play, the birds fly in and out, and you can see the mountains in the distance, and can hear the noise of tinkling cattle-bells and goat-bells in the street outside.

Who are the players? They are Oberammergau villagers, and are chosen by a committee of about twenty members. One takes the part of Christ; another of Mary, His mother; another Mary Magdalene; or Annas, Judas, or Peter. There are the crowds, too, the traders in the Temple, the crowd who shouted 'Hosanna!' and the crowd on the Crucifixion Day. Then there are the tableaux. These are Old Testament pictures, brought in to show how the Old Testament is linked to the New Testament. For instance, just before the scene where Judas sells Jesus for thirty pieces of silver,

there is the tableau of Joseph being sold by his brethren. Sometimes there are more than a hundred people on the stage at the same time, and some of them are such tiny little children, only four or five years old. They must be perfectly still for two minutes, in the tableaux, not wriggling or laughing in the slightest! But even the tiniest children are taught that it is a great honour to be in the Passion Play, and they try to please God by their acting.

The actors do not use wigs or grease-paint or such stage aids. Men let their hair grow long, so that they may be like the pictures of Jesus and His disciples. If you were in Oberammergau, when the Play was not being held, you might see Simon or Mary going about the village, doing the usual work in the shop or the house. One might be the village sculptor, another the mother of some children, and you would know that they had been training for months past to carry out their parts perfectly. These actors are simple village people, but they take their work very seriously, and prepare for months ahead. It is splendid to think that they are observing the vow which their forefathers made, and are offering to God their skill and their art as a perpetual reminder of the deliverance from plague granted nearly three hundred years ago. In these days people sometimes grow careless about keeping promises. Let the Oberammergau Passion Players be an example to us!

A Noble Record-Breaker.

BY THE REVEREND R. OSWALD DAVIES, LEICESTER.

'They all won their record.'—He II* (Moffatt).

We all regret the tragic, yet triumphant, death of Sir Henry Segrave. This gallant young man, at the early age of thirty-four, gave his life in the service of progress.

There are certain things about his achievements and character which we shall not easily forget. Let me mention a few of them.

1. First, *he lived a life that was not in vain*. When Sir Henry met his death on Lake Windermere in his attempt to beat the world's record in motor-boat racing, some people asked, 'Was it worth while?' They also said, 'What a foolish thing to do!'

The same things were said when he made his attempt to beat the world's record in motor-racing with the *Golden Arrow* at Daytona Beach, in Florida.

But was it for nothing that he took such tre-

mendous risks? Think for a moment. Think of the wonderful motor-vehicles that travel our roads to-day, from baby-cars to the big saloons. How they glide along with perfect ease. But it was not always so. To travel in an old-fashioned 'bus or motor-car was like a veritable nightmare. It was a rickety, noisy affair, and you were always glad to get out of it. While to travel at high speed on water was simply impossible. To-day it is so different. And why? It is due to racing, both on land and water. By racing, men have found out the weaknesses and defects of cars and engines. In this way their high efficiency has been tested and improvements have been made possible. It is because of the gallant attempts of men like Sir Henry Segrave that we are able to travel on land and water with ease and comfort and with less danger of accident.

For this reason he did not live his short life in vain. When some deed that is worth while is being attempted it is often risky.

Men who have performed great deeds have taken great risks, and for this very reason their lives have not been in vain.

2. Again, *he was nobly unselfish*. After beating the world's motor-racing record just over a year ago with his *Golden Arrow* at the magnificent speed of 231 miles per hour, he said: 'In events of this kind, when they are successful, usually the driver gets all the praise. But,' he added, 'I want to say that I was helped tremendously to do what I did. I want to thank Captain Irving especially, who designed and perfected the *Golden Arrow* for me. *But for him I should have been absolutely nowhere.*'

Wasn't that really splendid?

Again, in his final attempt on Lake Windermere he made an unselfish gesture. He took with him in the boat Mr. Halliwell, the chief engineer, although it was not really necessary for Mr. Halliwell to accompany him. It was, however, his desire for his chief engineer to share the credit in his achievement. As some one has said: 'He would have been the first to insist that any honour gained by himself should be shared by Halliwell.' That was typical of him. When success came his way, he was not selfish about it. He didn't keep all the praise to himself. 'Others have helped me,' he would say, 'and I want to acknowledge them.'

Success is a fine thing, but it can be spoiled by selfishness. Whatever success may be your lot, never forget that you are debtors to others—to your fathers and mothers, your teachers, your ministers, and a host of others.

That great man Paul said that he owed everything in his life to Jesus.

3. Finally, *Sir Henry was not satisfied with past achievements*. One might think that having beaten the world's speed-record on land he would have been satisfied. Many a man would have rested on his laurels after such a magnificent achievement as that. On his return home he was graciously received by the King and was given the high honour of knighthood. But Sir Henry did not rest there.

He turned his attention to motor-boat racing—a far more dangerous occupation than even racing on land. He could not rest content while there were other records to be broken in other fields and other laurels to be won.

With *Miss England II.* he made his final attempt. It cost him his life, but he broke the world's record. His last words were: 'Have I broken the record?' Segrave was a noble record-breaker—a pioneer of Progress.

We, too, must not be satisfied with past achievements, however good they may be. We must go forward seeking greater achievements in higher realms. The best is ever before us. 'Be ye, therefore, perfect,' said Jesus, 'as your Father which is in heaven is perfect.' We must not rest on our laurels while there are others to be won.

The eleventh chapter of the Epistle to the Hebrews is a Roll of Honour of some of the heroes of the past, all of whom were record-breakers. They all won their record for Faith, and there can be no nobler record than that.

The Christian Year.

TENTH SUNDAY AFTER TRINITY.

The Fulness of Joy.

'His presence is salvation.'—Ps 42^s (marg.).

'In thy presence is fulness of joy.'—Ps 16¹¹.

To be in any man's presence is to be near him. It is to be in the same room with him. It is to see him and to hear him. And it is that he should see and hear us. But God's presence is not like that. God's presence is not to be sought for in any one time, or in any place, like a man's presence. God Almighty does not dwell within the limits of time and space as He has made man to dwell. 'God is a Spirit, infinite, eternal, and unchangeable.' And, if He has a presence-chamber anywhere at all, let Him describe His presence-chamber to us Himself. 'For thus saith the High and lofty One that inhabiteth eternity, whose name is Holy: I dwell in

the high and holy place, with him also that is of a contrite and humble spirit, to revive the spirit of the humble, and to revive the heart of the contrite ones.' We shall never, to all eternity, fully understand the metaphysical presence of God, but even now and here we shall all enjoy His gracious presence and the light of His countenance, so far as we are of a humble and a contrite heart.

At the same time, absolutely impossible as it is for us at all to comprehend the bottomless mystery of the Divine Omnipresence, we cannot employ our minds better than by dazzling them and staggering them with such thoughts as these: *Deus ubique est: et totus ubique est*; that is to say, God is everywhere, and He is wholly everywhere. Just to take that first principle of the Divine Nature and to dwell upon it and to call it up continually in our minds, and to enter, as far as may be, into it, and to feed our souls upon it, and to take a majestic joy out of it—to what more blessed use can we put our best minds and all that is within us. And again, to take this: that in God all things live and move, and have their being: absolutely all things—from a grain of sand up to a solar system, and from a coral insect up to an archangel.

There is a little finger-length of a book entitled *Brother Lawrence on the Practice of the Presence of God*. Let us proceed to learn one or two lessons in that holiest and most blessed of all practices.

(1) And to begin with, let us 'practise the presence of God' by a firm faith in God, and a firm faith in His presence. God and His presence will come to be almost an object of sense to us, almost a matter of sight and touch to us, if we sufficiently practise it. But for a long time it must be a practice of pure faith. We do not need faith to practise the presence of any of our fellow-creatures. We can see them. But not God. No man with his eyes hath seen God at any time. And thus it is that 'he that cometh to God must believe that he is.' His faith must be, as it were, the 'substance' of his God to him. His faith must be to him the 'evidence' of his God's very existence to him, as the Apostle so nobly and so boldly has it—so much so, that faith, as it were, creates her God and sustains his ideal. God lives, and moves, and has His being, so to say, in His people's faith in Him. He is: He eternally and absolutely is, apart altogether from them and from their faith in Him. But it is their faith in Him that makes Him to be for them. 'Be it unto you,' our Lord was constantly saying, 'according to your faith.' He might have instituted some other principle for His

purpose than faith, but it did not seem good to Him to do so. And thus it is, that from beginning to end of the Christian life, and from centre to circumference, it is faith first, faith last, faith always, faith everywhere. And nowhere more than just here and in the practice of the presence of God. Practise faith, then, upon the presence of God, and that will give God a nearness to you and a reality to you and a power over you that nothing else can do.

(2) It is a very noble and ennobling practice that some men have of connecting God's presence with all His work in Nature and in providence as well as in grace. We like our work to be recognized and appreciated; and in this God has made us in His own image. It was one of His bitterest charges against Israel in Isaiah's day that they did not 'consider' Him. On the other hand, 'He maketh his sun to shine,' said our Lord, as often as He looked up into the summer sky. And within—William Law used to take his stand at his eastern window till the sun began to climb up into the morning sky, when he saluted his fellow-servant in these and like terms: 'Glorious creature,' he exclaimed, 'of the glorious Creator, come and let us serve and obey Him for another day, according to His ordinances.'

And then from Nature and from God's presence in Nature we will rise to practise His presence in His ever-loving and never-sleeping providence; in past history and in everyday history, in His daily newspapers as well as His inspired Word; and from that onwards and inwards to His daily and homely momentary providence of all kinds in our own life.

(3) The prophets and the psalmists of Israel made such splendid practice of this presence of the pure and absolute Godhead in their day, that, what they would have attained to, had they lived in our New Testament day, it is difficult to imagine. For how easy, and how pleasant, and how attractive, and how heart-winning it is to practise the presence of God in Christ. Are we practising the presence of God in act? Let us begin to do it in this simple and sincere way. Practise our presence back beside His presence. Practise our presence all up and down the four Gospels. Our presence at His baptism, at His temptation in the wilderness, at this sermon of Him and that, also this miracle of His and that, when He is healing a leper, practising His part, and possess ourselves of the experience of that unclean creature. When He is forgiving sins, practise being the forgiven sinner. Practise, in that way, every time we open the four Gospels;

and we will open them more than all other books in the world, taken together, and with good reason. And then from that, go on to practise His presence in it risen and glorified, understanding all the time that no small part of His glorification stands in His power and His will to be with us by His Divine presence and by His human sympathy, in ways and to results past all our understanding, but only the more sure to our experience. Let us practise His risen presence in our personal life, in our hours at home, in our secret heart. Let us see Him standing over us and inclining His ear towards us in our most secret hour of prayer. See Him sitting over against us when we sit down to do our work. Practise a fast faith in Him in all our trials and in all our crooked crosses.

Let us lay down this law to ourselves—that nothing comes to us of any kind without His permission, and we will soon be the men of the most serene and most self-possessed hearts. So, let us practise His presence, both in Scripture, and still more in our own hearts and lives, till if He were to come into our house to-night and in the body, we would feel at once at home with Him and He with us.

And now, just one quotation, by way of acknowledgment to Brother Lawrence for his inspiration. 'He had found such an advantage in living in this presence of God that it was natural for him to recommend it earnestly to others. But his example was a stronger inducement than any argument he could propose. His very countenance was edifying; such a sweet and calm devotion appearing in it as could not but affect the beholder. And it was observed, that in the greatest hurry of business in his kitchen (for he was cook to the society), he still preserved his recollection and his heavenly-mindedness. He was never hasty, nor loitering, but did each thing in its season, with an even, uninterrupted composure and tranquillity of mind. "The time of business," said he, "does not with me differ from the time of prayer, and in the noise and clatter of the kitchen I possess God in as great tranquillity as if I were upon my knees before the Blessed Sacrament."' ¹

ELEVENTH SUNDAY AFTER TRINITY.

Immortality and Common Sense.

'This mortal must put on immortality.'—1 Co 15⁵³.

Were St. Paul alive to-day would he still put it like that, or would he not rather put it: Immor-

¹ A. Whyte, *The Nature of Angels*, 199.

tality must put off this mortal? The real truth about us is not that we grow into immortality, but that we grow out of mortality. We find ourselves always coming back to this subject; and justly, because Jesus defines Himself in terms of it: 'I am come that they might have life, and have it more abundantly.' Supremely, in His own terms, He is the life-giver, or more exactly, perhaps, the life-revealer; for 'life and immortality are *brought to light* in the gospel.' He is Saviour because sin is the chief obstacle in the way of life. If we were not immortal it would not have been worth Christ's while to die for us. What is the good of saving dust from judgment? Really to believe in Christ is to believe that Christ's death for man implies man's immortality.

Our present body is not what it is merely intrinsically. It cannot be considered except in conjunction with this particular earth on which we live. It takes its qualities from this world in which we live, as much as from ourselves. There was an article in a scientific magazine the other day about one of the heavenly bodies—to be precise, the satellite of Sirius—which is of such an extraordinary density (ten thousand times the density of the earth), that if we lived there instead of on this planet, each of us would weigh about a thousand tons. In other words, the whole condition and constitution of life would be entirely changed for us by a mere change of the density of the globe on which we lived.

What does this mean? Surely that life is always adjusted to environment, or that environment is always adjusted to life. And that is the key to the survival of death, and the next world. Our trouble about it is precisely that it is going to upset all our values: we don't really want it because we imagine, we fear, that we are going to be entirely different persons there. These eyes that see sunsets and hail the dawn; these lungs that delight in the breath of the sweet air; these hands that grasp things that are real; these hearts that love other living hearts,—how are they going to fare under totally different conditions? Shadows and phantoms have no attraction for us: the whole thing is clothed in unreality.

But the 'real' for us is a mere matter of adjustment to our conditions. The heavenly life is just as real—as tangible—as this. It is a condition of all life. The birds of to-day's air evolved from the fishes whose element was the sea, millions of years ago. Precisely the same principle of life persists, but the new organism has adjusted itself perfectly to the new environment.

So when we get to the next world, so completely will we be adjusted to our new conditions that it will all seem just as real and as natural and inevitable as this world; and we will no more regret this world than the lark or the eagle regrets the sea, in which its remote ancestors lived. It is precisely this delusion about unreality that makes many people indifferent to—even half afraid of—the next world.

The trouble about immortality in the past has been that while it has been a postulate of faith, it has often failed to clarify and vindicate itself to reason. Reason has failed to see—or theology (especially in its revolt from the dogma of the resurrection of the flesh) has failed to make it clear to reason that

Eternal form shall still divide
Eternal soul from all beside.

Many people are less afraid of death as extinction, than they are afraid of death as the portal of the unknown and the unreal. They are afraid of life under unknown conditions. They might welcome 'sleep,' but they are afraid it won't be sleep: they are afraid of waking up—themselves—in conditions of fantastic unreality, in which they can no longer be themselves. And so we have the strong persuasion that if Jesus Himself had been writing these words of St. Paul's, He would have put them the other way round. He would have said that when we die it is not the mortal putting on immortality, but 'immortality putting off the mortal'—the essential 'I' adjusting itself to conditions as entirely real and natural to our new progress as those we have left behind.

Immortality is not fundamentally a matter of figures and calculations, even of history or faith. It is fundamentally a problem of ourselves. Anything and everything we *may* be is founded on *what we are*. That is why Christ never proved it, and said very little about the Beyond, and spent almost all His time and energy on the present; on getting people to understand themselves, and to believe in Him. Not in theories about Him, but in Him—what He was. For you will never really want to be anything Beyond, until you are very sure what you are now. That is the problem. 'The relationship,' says Dr. Fosdick, in an article in *Harper's Magazine*, 'between those nine billion brain cells with which we do our thinking on the one side, and on the other our personalities, our thoughts, ideals, purposes, loves, and all the expanding possibilities of our characters, is the most baffling problem in the universe. The merely

physical explanation of ourselves becomes the more difficult the farther one goes into it. For suppose some instrument so ingenious that looking through it one could see the brain cells of a man at work. Then suppose that some mirror could make the instrument introspective, so that a man could watch his own brain cells at work. It would be a curious experience. *For who would be doing the watching?* Unless you are prepared to assume that the brain cells are watching themselves, the materialist position becomes impossible. 'Some modern chemists,' Dr. Fosdick goes on to tell us, 'have been analysing the average man and have put into picturesque terms what he is made of: enough fat to make seven bars of soap; enough iron to make one nail of medium size; enough sugar to fill a shaker; enough lime to whitewash a chicken-coop; enough phosphorus to make twenty-two hundred match-tips; enough magnesium for one good dose of magnesia; enough potassium to explode a toy cannon; a pinch of sulphur. And they say that the market value of these chemicals is about four shillings.'

The first question is not what this may become, but what it is now. 'Does any one honestly think,' Dr. Fosdick goes on, 'that a few chemical elements, worth about two shillings and sixpence a hundredweight, cleverly organised by Nature, ignorant of what she was doing, has resulted in our Isaiahs and Platos, our Galileos and Darwins, and — forgive the irreverence — in Jesus Christ Himself?' If we don't believe it we must be prepared to accept the alternative: and there is only one alternative. And that is that matter does not explain spirit, and that spirit is independent of matter. Or, in other words, that the immortal *can* put off mortality.

There can be no worse hell for some men than knowing what they have become in the light of what they really are: the seeing—when these mortal eyes have ceased to veil reality—of what they have done with their immortality. The picture of Christ the terrible judge of mediæval theology has never seemed to be clothed with any persuasive reality. His sorrow is more to be dreaded than His rebuke. His 'depart from me' more to be feared than the sentence of hell. As Newman has it in the *Dream of Gerontius*:

And these two pains, so counter and so keen,
The longing for Him, when thou seest Him not;
The shame of self at thought of seeing Him,
Will be thy veriest, sharpest purgatory.

God's laws do not break down in that other

world; the great principles which govern life here, govern life everywhere; and the larger immortal life there will be a perfect and wholly natural and inevitable mutual adjustment of environment and life. But a man cannot neglect his immortality now and not pay the price then. The 'outer darkness' of one of His parables—cleansed of its mediæval accretions—rendered simply as the darkness which is outside God, the darkness of separation from God—is a very real and terrible thing.

Of 'sins' Christ spoke often, but always in terms that suggested that He could deal with them summarily and authoritatively. 'Thy sins are forgiven thee.' But He only spoke of 'sin' in one definite and decisive connexion: 'If I had not come, they had not known *sin*; but now they have no excuse for their sin.' And what is sin? 'Of sin because they believe not on me.' And who is He? 'In him was life.' 'Ye will not come unto me that ye might have life'—their own life. We may be scarred, tempest-tossed, beaten, and fallen, but if we never let go of Life, of Him who is the Life, He will never let us go; and He will hold us, cleanse us, save us though as by fire.¹

TWELFTH SUNDAY AFTER TRINITY.

The Unpurchasable Things of Life.

'And he said unto her, Because I spake unto Naboth the Jezreelite, and said unto him, Give me thy vineyard for money; or else, if it please thee, I will give thee another vineyard for it: and he answered, I will not give thee my vineyard.'—1 K 21⁹.

To give Ahab his due, he never intended to go the length he did when first he cast envious and longing eyes upon Naboth's little vineyard. He wished Naboth no harm; indeed, in other circumstances he might have been glad to advance the worthy man's interests. But unfortunately those interests happened to clash with the schemes for expansion which the powerful monarch had under contemplation. That little bit of land bordered upon his own wide demesne, and was the most convenient outlet for the plans he was evolving; and to invade it at all costs he was determined.

It was no mere sentiment which dictated Naboth's determined refusal of the tyrant's request. And this Ahab knew, or should have known. Canaan was to every Israelite in a peculiar manner God's land. They considered themselves His tenants; and this was one of the conditions of their leases, that they should not alienate any

¹ H. F. Brierley, *Life Indeed*, 52.

part of that which fell to their lot, unless in case of extreme necessity.

Somehow or other Ahab must circumvent the other's squeamish conscience. He has evidently no thought of violating by force the other's ground ; but he will buy him out if he can. What will Naboth take to let the imperious monarch pursue unchecked his schemes of aggrandizement ? Will he take the full value in cash of the invaded land, or will he accept a better vineyard in exchange ? Bribes, entreaties, threats—all are unavailing. Ahab did not know his man.

The sequel is interesting, and withal strangely familiar. Ahab's evil genius at his side prompts him to throw honour and all moral and religious considerations to the winds, and work his will. 'What is the use of having might if you do not exercise it ?' she whispered. 'Dost thou now govern Israel ?' And down the tyrant goes and takes possession by the power of the sword. The deed is shameful and barefaced enough in itself, but the accompanying circumstances of its committal make it worse. For in the process there is a travesty of law, a mockery of religion, and a revolting show of regard for justice and righteousness.

In one of the most dramatic scenes in the Old Testament, Elijah, the man of God, encounters Ahab at the very height of his seeming triumph. And Ahab's face grew pale, and the spirit shrivelled within him, like a tendril of one of the stolen vines at the scorching breath of the desert wind.

Naboth paid the price of honour and loyalty and religious conviction in full, as it has been paid in the same ruddy coin many a time since then. The stand that he made was not for himself alone, but for posterity. And his action stands for all time as testimony to the truth that there are some things in life that are unpurchasable. It is not its rental in broad acres that makes a man willing to shed the last drop of his blood in defence of his country. No doubt the market price of it might be weighed to the seller, or some fairer corner of the earth be had in exchange for it. It is because it is the 'inheritance of his fathers' that makes it without price in his sight. 'I will give thee another vineyard for it'—the very suggestion is insulting. Other soil may be more fertile, but none is so sacred. The isles of Greece may be small ; but a blind old man wandered among them telling his deathless stories, and so they live. Scottish soil may be hard to turn ; but there was a ploughman who drew one furrow whence an unending harvest of inspiration is reaped, and he that bindeth

sheaves filleth his bosom. 'I will give thee the worth of it in money.' No, Ahab simply did not know what he was saying when he made his insulting proposal to Naboth.

Not one of the gifts of God may be purchased with money—not honour, not love, not peace of conscience, not even the respect of our fellow-men. 'If a man would give all the substance of his house for love it would utterly be contemned.' You buy a book, but there is something in the book that you cannot buy. You may handle in pride of possession the material form and substance of your purchase, but not the book of the poet or the thinker. There is something here which you may never be able to call your own, and that is the priceless thing about the book. So of the salvation of God in Christ, so of high thoughts and sympathy, and happiness and peace, and the visions of faith and hope ; they all are gifts—unspeakable and unpurchasable gifts.

What made Naboth so stout in the defence of his little vineyard, so brave in his defiance of the thieving tyrant ? Had he ever sold something of value, and learned only after he had parted with it what its true worth was ? And had he vowed that not even gold from the royal treasury should ever tempt him to part with that which remained ? At any rate, he had come to see that not even life itself was worth the keeping if he parted with the little vineyard.

In one of its most devilishly cynical phrases the world roundly declares and believes that 'Every man has his price.' It may be so ; but there have been those who have made theirs prohibitive—to the glory of God and the confounding of Ahab. There are always the two points of view, that of Ahab and that of Naboth. The one cannot understand the other's jealous guardianship of that which seems so small and insignificant. Why not part with honour, or with innocence, or with that ideal ? 'I will give thee the worth of it in money.' Why make that pig-headed stand for the religious and moral standards of the fathers ?

Oh, Ahab is a specious pleader as well as a powerful monarch. Do not think that Naboth did not feel the force of the temptation. Most powerfully *He* felt it, *He* our Naboth, who defended for us the vineyard of our inheritance, the wine of the unpurchasable sacrament. For a mightier than Ahab showed Him all the kingdoms of the world in a moment of time : 'All these will I give thee if——' But *He* would not. And they brought against Him also men, sons of Belial ; and Him, too, they carried forth out of the city, and with a mockery of justice they brought Him in the end to

death. But the Prince of Darkness did not get the vineyard.

Don't sell it to him now. You have parted with much, perhaps, much whose unpurchasable worth you realized too late. Keep the wine of the priceless vintage to the last. There is no man who does not feel the force of that seductive voice, 'Give me thy vineyard, that I may have it for a garden of herbs, because it is near unto my house.' As if that were any excuse! Because sin is specious and access easy for the devil, that therefore we should surrender at will!

It is just part of the arrogant blindness of Ahab that he can never see the value of that with which he would have us part so lightly. It was not for nothing that the fathers defended and handed down the little quiet spaces where the spirit walks with God. Those things that we refuse to sell—the little vineyards upon which the world deems that so ready a price may be put, we defend them not for the memory of the fathers alone, nor yet for the slaking of our own souls' thirst, but because we have a duty and a high responsibility to the generations yet unborn.¹

THIRTEENTH SUNDAY AFTER TRINITY.

I know in Part.

'Now I know in part; but then shall I know even as also I am known.'—I Co 13¹².

St. Paul did not profess to know everything. In regard to many things of vast import he had honestly to admit that he did not know.

There was a time in the life of St. Paul when he knew much more than he did when he wrote this Hymn of Love; a time when he knew more and loved less. Like some of the rest of us, he had been trained in a system of theology in which little was left unknown. His teachers knew the nature of God, the names and number of the angels, and the end of all things. As often happens, his knowledge made him narrow, bigoted, and intolerant, as if it were not sure of itself.

Much depends upon the tone of voice and heart in which we say that we do not know. It may be said in a tone of sad finality, if not dogmatic denial, implying that there is nothing to know. Such an attitude was alien to the mind of St. Paul, who was neither negative nor neutral, as so many are to-day. The issues involved were too profound, too far-reaching. One cannot think of St. Paul singing the plaintive minor music of our time, half query and half protest. Never! His music was akin to that

high, heroic, lonely voice echoing across the ages, 'I know that my Redeemer liveth,' flinging out his faith in the teeth of tragedy. As he himself said elsewhere, 'I know whom I have believed, and am persuaded that he is able to keep that which I have deposited with him.' In other words, he thought expectantly, as one who knew that there is always truth ahead, more truth to be known, truth more wonderful than we have yet imagined. Such should be our attitude to-day, in the midst of the extraordinary advance of knowledge.

1. Here we are in an amazing universe, alive, active, thinking, dreaming, loving, seeking to know the meaning of the world and our place and duty in it. Manifestly, then, if there is any key to the riddle it must be found in something within ourselves, since we cannot leap outside ourselves to discover it. Nor do we need to do so, because we are within Nature, not opposed to it, but a part of it; and this means that in values, as in consciousness, we are on the inside, and have, in our own nature, a clue to its meaning. Nay, more; we are agents, actors, participants in the actual life of the universe, not mere spectators of reality, but part of it.

By the same token, if there is a spiritual element in man, which no one denies, it must have come from the universe itself, if not from physical nature, then from some Power behind and within physical nature, else it would not be in man. Also, the spiritual quality, so to name it, must be greater in the universe than in man, since its development in man is still so incomplete. Here, truly, is a firm basis of faith, built into the very structure of our being, and *the first fact upon which we build is the moral sense in man*. Here it is, rooted in the very bottom of our being, interpret it as we like—an impulse, an insight, an inner censor, an awful whisper of command—as much a part of the universe as pig-iron or potash; something which has never accepted utter identification with outer force or brute fact. At the core of consciousness is conscience, a sense of right and wrong, an inexorable demand for obedience to an inner law. Like everything else, it may vary with race, custom, depth of insight, and degree of development, but it is a fact of Nature and life.

The two overwhelming mysteries, as Kant said, are the still depth of a starlit sky and the silent whisper of the moral law in the soul of man; and one is as real as the other. Explain the moral life of man how we will, describe it as an infantile inhibition of humanity, as the fashion now is, declare it to be only an echo within us of an old

¹ H. L. Simpson, *Put Forth by the Moon*, 144.

ancestral memory, or the shadow of an ancient fear—that is only to push the mystery farther back and deeper down. The origin of the moral life, the initial bias toward righteousness remain to be accounted for. It is here within us, unaccountably. We did not create it. Whether we can destroy it or not, we do not know. When we obey it, we are happy; when we disobey it, we are thwarting our own nature and defying the law of our very being. To explain it away is not to send it away.

Upon this fact, then, we may build, as Robertson did when, as a young man, sorely troubled about his faith and the meaning of his life, he went to the Alps to fight it out. The only thing which the analysis could not dissolve and destroy was the moral law within, and so, 'clinging obstinately to moral good,' in spite of himself, he built upon that firm basis the edifice of his faith.

2. The second thing that we know is no less sure; it is *that we have the power to choose what is right and to refuse what is wrong*, or, contrariwise, to choose the wrong and refuse the right. Having done both, we know that it is true. At once we are faced by a vague fatalistic philosophy now in vogue, albeit hoary with age, which tells us that we are no more responsible for what we do than we are for the shape of our heads and the colour of our eyes. No doubt it is plausible and many facts may be arrayed in its behalf; but every man knows that it is false. When Dr. Johnson had heard all the facts in favour of fatalism, he brought his old cane down with a thump, and said, 'I know I am free, and that is the end of it.'

Fate is a fact, and so is freedom. Much of our life is ordered for us by fate, and runs in grooves which it must follow; most of it is fixed before we arrive. Still, limitation has its limits, and it is the fate of man to be free. Hedged about, restricted, enmeshed in a network of laws, his liberty is none the less real because it is limited, as it must be of necessity by the fact that he is finite, as well as by the nature and purpose of his life.

Just the same, as Tennyson said, 'If we are birds in a cage, we decide whether we are to sit on the upper perch or the lower.' If Fate is supreme, then there must be a Higher Fatalism which includes moral law and the quest of truth, obedience to which sets us free. Or perhaps we may say that the will of man is free in that it is not *compelled*, but limited in the sense that it is *impelled* by the law of its own being, as well as by the pervasive and ultimately persuasive influence of the good which is stronger than evil.

3. Even the moral life, with its awful law and its

perilous liberty, is not all that we find within these 'little infinite human souls.' There is something else; something elusive, ineluctable, irresistible, unconscious oft, unsatisfied ever; something free and flaming—a *motion and a passion that run beyond duty, beyond righteousness, in quest of goodness.*

No one can define religion; it breaks through all language and escapes. At once a mystery and a madness, no one can tell what it will do or become next, except that it will do some impossible thing and talk about it in parables. One day it gives us a militarist like Cromwell, the next a pacifist like Tolstoy or Ghandi. It turns Fra Angelico to art, and the Puritans against art. In one age it created the drama, and in the next prohibited it. It fashions a stately Roman procession and a quaint Quaker bonnet; the Gothic glory of a cathedral—its tower a nesting-place of dreams—and the drabness of a country meeting-house.

4. There is another thing that we know: both *our moral sense and our religious nature*—shy, lonely, wistful, adventurous—*find fulfilment and satisfaction in the life, personality, and character of Jesus*, as nowhere else. Some one asked Bertrand Russell two questions: 'Do you fully understand the Einstein theory of relativity? and do you go with him all the way?' Quick as a flash the great mathematician replied: 'I answer the first question in the negative, and the second in the affirmative.' That is exactly our attitude toward Jesus. He baffles our mind, but He searches our heart and sways it as no one else can do. His tragic Figure of heroic moral loveliness subdues us, chastens us, challenges us, redeems us. To us Jesus is a dream come true, a vision verified, the lost, ineffable Word made flesh, and then spirit again; the Life that interprets life, revealing a tender love hidden in a terrible mystery.

5. One other thing we know, too, beyond the shadow of doubt or cavil: *soon or late we must obey the vision of moral power and spiritual beauty we have seen in Jesus—we can never be happy until we do.* But, if we needs must follow the highest when we see it, we must have help for the adventure, and we can get it. This, too, we know with an assurance made doubly sure by the testing of time and trial. The Church, in spite of its faults and failings, is a profound help. The Church is 'a society for the promotion of goodness in the world,' as Arnold said, and to unite in an historic fellowship of men seeking goodness is both an inspiration and a consecration. It is like climbers of the Alps, who tie themselves together, so that if one slip all hold him up.

The Bible is a help, too, though, alas, it is so little known and used by those who would love it best if they sought its counsel. Also, there is help for all who ask for it in prayer. Whether we call it fellowship with God or adjustment to the universe, it deals directly with reality, wherein, as Dante told us, lies our peace. Of all forms of human effort, prayer is the most profoundly practical, if we add the will to listen and work for its answer. One reads the life of St. Teresa with mingled awe and joy, remembering the eighteen years she devoted to the mastery of this highest of all arts.

These things we know beyond a doubt, and upon them we build a working faith for to-day and a singing hope for the morrow. Moral law and liberty, the sense of the Infinite in the finite, the fascination and challenge of the life of Jesus, and what the Prayer Book calls 'the means of grace'—life cannot be ignoble or worthless when it gives us such guidance in a world where there is truth to seek, love to win, work to do, and beauty to adore.¹

FOURTEENTH SUNDAY AFTER TRINITY.

HARVEST SERMON.

First-fruits and Last Fruits.²

'Thou shalt take of the first of all the fruit of the ground, which thou shalt bring in from thy land . . . and set it down before the altar of the Lord thy God.'—Dt 26²⁻⁴ (R.V.).

The earth yielding her increase is a great mystery. In all ages it has stirred imagination and wonder and joy. Harvest festivals of some sort are as old as man the agriculturist. There is no little interest in getting to know how other peoples have kept harvest. The Jews had their own festivals. For them there was hardly any joy like the joy of harvest.

That interesting old book of laws—Deuteronomy, has preserved some of the old regulations and customs that belonged to harvest. The reaping had neither to be without thought of God, nor without thought of others. The first-fruits had to be given to God. 'Thou shalt take of the first of all the fruit of the ground, which thou shalt bring in from thy land, and set it down before the altar of the Lord thy God.' It was in the nature of a thank offering, and the custom goes much farther back than the Jews. It was an old Semitic custom,

and until it had been observed, the rest of the crop was not regarded as lawful food.

There were old superstitions about it being *unsafe* to eat of new crops until the gods had received their share. Amongst the Jews the amount to be presented seems to have been left to the discretion of the offerer. It must have been a picturesque thing in later days to see the procession of such offerers coming into Jerusalem, with their wreathed baskets on their shoulders, to present them in the Temple courts, to the accompaniment of music and song.

As they handed gifts over to the priest, they had to repeat, what at first sight seems a curious formula—far removed from the thought of harvest—'A Syrian ready to perish was my father, and he went down into Egypt and sojourned there.' Then came a reference to the captivity and the deliverance and the ultimate entrance into the land of Promise. The Jew is to remember that things were not always thus with Israel. He is to cast his eyes over the generations until he sees a family of nomads, a wandering clan, who gathered no harvests, but lived from hand to mouth. Behind the harvest, he was to remember a history and a human pilgrimage—in the hope that the remembrance would stir the sense of wonder and gratitude. From gathered wheat and barley, grapes and figs, and olives and honey, the thought leaps to 'old unhappy far-off things, and battles long ago.' The possibility of a harvest was rooted in far-off heroisms. It was because some one had once gone out, not knowing whither he went, to whom Canaan was a land of dreams, that to a later age it had become a homeland.

In the hour of rewarded toil, the Israelite was to remember that he was reaping, not only his own sowing, but the sowings of past ages, in the way of daring faith and sacrifice. We might not have thought of that in connexion with harvest, but those old legislators did. The rule reveals a fine insight into the deeper significance of life. In this old custom we see one of the noblest uses to which history can be put, namely, to stir moods of wonder and gratitude, the sense of obligation to the heroisms of the past, the remembrance that others laboured and we have entered into their labours. The formula may with many have become a form, a remembrance in word rather than in thought. But in so far as the offerers entered into the spirit of that remembrance, they would the more richly and joyously enter into the occasion of the first-fruits. For giving can itself be a joy and an enrichment of the spirit.

¹ J. F. Newton, *Things I know in Religion*, 7.

² By the Rev. F. C. Hoggarth, Great Horton, Bradford.

Though the amount of the offering was left to the individual, there was an expectation as to quality. There is rather a fine gesture in the idea of first-fruits. A man did not say that anything would do. It was expected he would have a pride in his offering—bringing the first-fruits of the ground and the fattest lamb of the flock. There is not a little help in an expectation of that kind, and the stronger it can be made the better. For there is often a tendency and a temptation to offer to God that in which no pride could be taken. Lest the temptation should be too great, the Hebrew put a barrier against it in his law. But the proper place for such a barrier is in the heart. The days have probably gone by when the support of religion could be made compulsory. Yet freedom should not be an excuse for selfishness. It is thought by some that in the gift of first-fruit is to be found the origin of the tithe. In any case, for the Jew the support of worship and of religion was not a casual charge. As far as the law could, it saw that people's gifts to religion were adequate and regular. Conditions have changed—and voluntary systems are now in vogue. It has been truly said that not the least condemnation of many Christians are the ways to which churches are driven to raise money.

There is no end of Christians who no longer 'give' to the Church—they only pay. The condition of their support is that they get a tea or a concert in return. There is no opening of the hand, no stirring of great emotions, no sense of deep obligations, or of the importance of the Church and all it stands for in the life of the nation.

If the Hebrew gave his first-fruits to God, he gave his last fruits to the poor and needy. In the same book of laws, Deuteronomy, there is a number of ancient harvest regulations, drawn up in a spirit of brotherhood. 'When thou reapest thine harvest and hast forgot a sheaf in the field, thou shalt not go again to fetch it.' 'When thou beatest thine olive tree, thou shalt not go over the boughs again.' 'When thou gatherest the grapes of thy vineyard, thou shalt not glean after it.' The residue in all these cases was to be for the stranger, the fatherless, the widow. The law is not permissive, but imperative. Its terms are 'thou shalt.' Given no spirit of brotherhood, the law doubtless could be evaded, though observed in the letter. If the law forbids you to go over your boughs a second time, and if you do not want those in need to share somewhat with you in the generousities of Nature, obviously one could go over the boughs with double thoroughness the first time.

The intention was that the Jew at harvest-time should not only recognize his ties with the past, but also with the present. He was bound up in one bundle of life with his needy contemporaries—the widow, the stranger, the fatherless—that is, those for whom life's provisions and protections were inadequate, through misfortune or loss, or the accident of birth or circumstance. Such had a claim for consideration, a right to glean in the fields of the prosperous. We see the gleaners at work in that lovely idyll, the Book of Ruth. There were times evidently when it had a romance all its own!

In former days in England, a labourer's children would be kept from school to glean. They rose at 4 a.m., carrying a bag in front of them for the short ears, those without straw. When enough of the longer ones had been gathered, they were tied in bundles and left in the stubble, and the gleaners knew their own.

The year's rent was sometimes made in this way. Gleaning has died out with the advent of the self-binder mowing machines.

In the old days in Israel, every harvest field and vine and olive tree proclaimed the truth of neighbourliness and charity. There was in the law of the land a check against the acquisitive spirit that would have all. 'Business is business,' we say. Here in the midst of the harvest field was a human touch which suggested charity rather than business. That sheaf in the field and those ungathered olives and grapes are symbolic of a far-reaching principle that still needs to be incorporated into life, however different the expression of it may be. Such succour and kindly aid is more than a private matter. For instance, there is the recognition that no one in our midst must starve. More and more has corporate responsibility for the unfortunate and the handicapped been recognized. There are many gracious and beautiful social services carried on under the ægis of a modern city. Canon Barnett of Toynbee Hall, who knew as intimately as any man the needs and problems of the East End of London, said there was need for a new beatitude. 'Blessed are the tax-payers.' It takes the sting out of some of them to know they are acceptable unto God. In this case God loves a cheerful taxpayer. It is a form of giving; and the tax-collector helps some to do good with their money, who might otherwise forget. 'Inasmuch as ye did it unto one of the least of these,' through rates or taxes, 'ye did it unto me.'

That is not an argument for squandering money, especially on other people's money. It does not follow

because taxes and rates are high that the right things are necessarily being most effectively or most economically done. What is needed is reappropriation, not increase; less on war, for instance, and more on things like health and education. Safeguards should be taken against abuse. Other humane services depend on voluntary gifts. They are one

of the splendid aspects of our age. Never was there in any age such a variety and multiplicity of service for the handicapped and unfortunate. Their maintenance depends on the development of a high sense of responsibility, remembering the right of the less privileged to glean in the harvest fields of our lives.

Recent Foreign Theology.

The Kingdom of God and the Church in the New Testament.

WHEN in the latter part of last century the social problem was forced on the attention of the Christian Church, and some advanced thinkers began to realize the social applications of the Christian gospel, the term, *The Kingdom of God*, so common in the Gospels, and yet so largely neglected in Christian theology, was revived as the standard around which these new interests might be gathered. The ardent champions of this revival did not pause to ask themselves whether their interpretation of the term was the same as the intention of Jesus. Some of the social reformers from Great Britain and America were not a little disconcerted to find that their use of the term was challenged by the German scholars at the Stockholm Conference. To their confident conviction that the Kingdom of God might be advanced and hastened on earth by human endeavour, there was opposed the charge of an optimism and an activism, inconsistent with that humble sense of man's insufficiency and that submissive dependence on God's sole sufficiency which was put forward as the distinctively Christian piety by the Lutheran speakers. For them the Kingdom of God meant a transcendent, catastrophic Divine intervention in human history, and not an evolutionary human moral and religious progress. The eschatological school of critics gave to this exclusive interpretation the authority of Jesus Himself. While mutual intercourse may have done something to modify the opposition, the contrast of conception still remains. It is in the circumstances an interesting and important contribution to the treatment of this question which is offered in the volume before us.¹

For thoroughness of treatment, orderliness of arrangement, clearness of exposition, and, in my judgment, persuasiveness of reasoning, it would not be easy to find a match to this volume; and the author has deserved well for what must have been an immense labour, but evidently a labour of love. As one might have expected, he goes to the very roots of the question.

In the first part he discusses the royal rule (*Königsherrschaft*) of God. In the first section here there is an historical survey of the Old Testament; the second deals with the fundamental character of the New Testament proclamation of the rule; what is emphasized is its dynamic character. God is constantly, supremely active. 'Jesus' deed is God's deed, that means nothing else than that His person is inseparable from His work.' 'Jesus no more teaches about the Kingdom, but He brings it in His Messianic dealing actually into the present, as well with His doing as with His word, which above all is the creative principle of His total activity.' . . . 'Only one Messianic figure remained open to Him for realization, that of the Servant and the Son of Man Messiah of Deutero-Isaiah, and of Daniel' (pp. 61-62). This conception of the Divine rule gives consistency to the New Testament representations. In the following sections the characteristics of the kingly activity of God are very fully discussed. (a) It is *above time*: linked as it is to Jesus' conception of God, it leads us to set aside evolutionism and synergism. 'The Divine rule,' he maintains, 'is nowhere thought as a developing one, to say nothing of a realm to be reached by human activity, but is always constituted by God's action, which is likewise an *a priori*, that is, an operation carried through outside of all human activity' (pp. 71, 72). This Divine activity is the motive of human repentance and faith. This interpretation the author seeks to justify by a careful exegesis both of the parables and of the letters. (b) It is *opposed to*

¹ *Reich Gottes und Kirche im Neuen Testament*, von Dr. theol. Gerhard Gloege (C. Bertelsmann, Gütersloh, 1929; Mk. 12.50).

this world. It is the coming in contrast to the present æon. The opposition to the cosmos is of a moral religious character, and yet it has too a positive teleological character in relation to the world, as not only a universal cosmical, but also an ethical-soteriological completion. (c) It is accordingly *present in the world*. The eschatological explanation must be limited. Present and future are one in the dynamic conception of God's rule, for in the activity of Jesus God is active. In opposition to the eschatological school the author affirms confidently that the available sources prove that 'Jesus not only proleptically, but in the full sense of the word regarded Himself, and accordingly was active as the Christ' (p. 142). (d) It is *redemptive*; God's constant activity in Christ forgives and imparts new vitality (*Lebendigkeit*). (e) It is *unconditional*, as will be manifest at the *Parousia*. The doctrine of the Resurrection sets aside the spiritualism of the Greek hope of immortality, and is characterized by realism. 'In this word (1 Co 15²⁸) not only is the final purpose, for which the (Christian) community expectantly waits described, but also that occurrence by which the whole history of the world and man flows into the rule of God, to become one eternally with His kingly activity' (p. 200).

The second part of the book deals with the Church; and we could only wish that all the discussions on the reunion of the Churches went down as deeply into the roots of the matter. The Church-consciousness of the primitive community is described, and the description firmly links the two parts of the book together. 'Primitive Christianity found its very existence, in all that marked it as Church, singly and alone in its dependence on the sovereign action of God. All its confessions about itself have their elementary formal unity in this, that it had the source of its life in God, who had created it through Christ, and the goal of its life in God, who by Christ would complete it' (p. 202). The New Testament conception of the Church is also based on the Old Testament. The significance of the term *ecclesia*, as the claim of the Church to be 'the true Israel,' is recognized by the author. He is not content with this verbal connexion, but seeks a more vital. As regards its source, limits, and purpose the Church is, as was Israel, determined by God's sovereign activity. The connexion is similar to that with 'the remnant' of the Old Testament, the community saved by God, and possessing the Spirit. Having thus shown the Old Testament roots, the author defines the nature of the Church. Christ is the Creator and

the Saviour of the community. It is the remnant, and this gives special significance to the circle of disciples. As regards the relation of the Church to the Kingdom, it is neither identical with the Kingdom nor yet a substitute for it; but it is the organ of the Divine action. 'This means: it owes its origin and its existence to the kingly act of God, but carries this at the same time forward independently by its own action, and exactly in this its own action has it its essential continuance' (p. 257). It is as both object and agent of God's activity that the Church is His organ. As such, the Church has the following characteristics: (a) it is *above the world*. Christ is 'the original element' of the Church, the foundation. God works in it by His Spirit. It is the body of Christ, and His 'bond-slave.' He is the Head of the Church, and it is His Bride. Close as is the relation of Christ and Church, yet it is not a mystical identity. That is excluded by the objective factor of the Spirit, and the subjective factor of faith. The relation always remains religious and moral. (b) It is *opposed to the world*, because holy, dominated by the Spirit, chosen and called of God, turned away from the world, as feeling itself a stranger and ready to suffer with Christ in the world. It is God's kingly rule that draws the Church towards Him, and away from the world. (c) It is *in the world*. Subject to the conditions of time and space, it is active in the world, and becomes an actuality in the world (*Dinglichkeit*), quantitatively as visible in the world and qualitatively as impure, and in conflict with sin. (d) It is *one*. The contrast of the total community and the local congregation is resolved in the thought of God's activity, which is the objective factor of its unity, while the subjective are the common faith, love, and hope. As a body the Church is unity-in-variety. As the one organ of God's activity on earth, the Church claims universality. As such a universal organ, its purpose is to bring about the human syntheses, not by merely proclaiming God's rule, nor by trying to establish God's rule, but by becoming the channel in the word of reconciliation in Christ of the kingly activity of God until the day when God shall be all in all. The careful exegesis on which the whole treatment is based is beyond praise. Sometimes the author inclines to be too meticulously critical of those who even in a small matter differ from him. His purpose is to give the New Testament teaching without any admixture of modern views; but he recognizes that some parts of the teaching of the New Testament, such as the eschatology, cannot be literally transferred to modern constructive

Christian thought. But no thought will remain Christian which neglects the New Testament. This volume as an informed, intelligent, and appreciative study of the New Testament deserves the warmest commendation.

Theology as Autobiography.

I HAVE in previous numbers of THE EXPOSITORY TIMES called attention to this valuable series, *Die Religionswissenschaft der Gegenwart in Selbstdarstellung*,¹ edited by Dr. Erich Stange. The editor in the preface states that the publisher has decided that this fifth volume must be the last. This decision is to be regretted, as, while most of the leading scholars and thinkers of Germany have been included, the list of those worth knowing has not been exhausted; and theology outside of Germany has had only a few representatives. Nevertheless, the possessor of the five volumes will have a wide survey of German theology at least, presented in the autobiographies of those chosen for the distinction of inclusion. The selection has not been partisan, as one volume has been assigned to Roman Catholic theologians. In this fifth volume are included Martin Dibelius, Paul Feine, Ferd. Kattenbusch, Emil W. Mayer, Willy Staerk, Paul Wernle—a varied selection. 'The personal equation' is not obtruded at all; and the interest is concentrated on the subjects with which each theologian has been led to deal. For instance, Dibelius has something to say about the development of *Formlehre*, and about the wider contacts of German scholars since the War. Feine sketches his own inner development as a reaction from the extreme liberal to the central evangelical position. 'It is the aim,' he says, 'of New Testament scholarship, as I see its task, to draw a picture of Christ which seeks to keep itself free of the false ways, on which the nineteenth century entered, and of the modern and most modern theories, which lead away from the New Testament traditions' (p. 81). Willy Staerk represents a similar reaction from the too exclusive use of the religious historical method of dealing with the Old Testament. The problem he states as follows: 'What way of presentation will be most readily just to this *systematic-theological* aspect of the Word of God in the Old Testament, and at the same time to the *religious-historical* therein, which cannot be overlooked in view of the

characteristic structure of the religion of Israel as a *complexio oppositorum*, and of the temporal differences, and differences due to the development of the piety of the Old Testament witnesses' (p. 196). While Staerk welcomes the work of the coming generation as building upon the historical foundations laid by the last, Paul Wernle rather plaintively states that he does not expect any understanding of his labours from them. 'I am,' he says, 'firmly convinced that the at present so loved one-sidedness can only be a passing solution, and that especially the striving after harmony will not allow itself permanently to be driven out of the human soul, and consequently out of the theologian's soul' (p. 249). The harmony he desires is of the three ways of reaching norms, 'authority, religious experience, and thought.' Ferdinand Kattenbusch states that his special interest has been in Symbolics generally, but he has found the Apostles' Creed alone a great enough task. 'A last secret hope still remains for my labour: *the problem of revelation*. There naturally it will be necessary to clarify the thought of the "Word of God." I stand very sympathetically towards the latest theological formulation, that led by Karl Barth, which has express reference to this, but I cannot conceal that it runs the danger of a false development, and of turning against Luther. Yet I hope that it will find the way from Calvin to him' (p. 118). One of the contributors, Emil Walter Mayer, has since writing passed away. His life itself has a special interest in two respects. He was born, and his school education was in France, and he functioned as a professor in Strassburg; but Germany was by his own choice his 'fatherland.' His work has been on dogmatics, apologetics, and ethics. It is interesting to note that he confines the task of the Christian Church to cultivate the Christian disposition (*Gesinnung*), Faith and Love as the most important; and declines its participation in external arrangements. 'For example,' he says, 'a League of Nations may be in itself able to do a great deal that is good; but what is the use of such an institution, when its agents are filled not with a truly Christian disposition, but a selfish one' (p. 156). That was written in 1926 by a very patriotic German. These are but examples of the varied living interests which pervade the whole volume. A more attractive way of studying theology cannot be imagined; and one must be deeply grateful to contributors, editor, and publishers for realizing their purpose so admirably.

ALFRED E. GARVIE.

¹ Verlag von Felix Meiner in Leipzig (Kartoniert; R.M.8.50, In Ganzleinen Geschenkbund; R.M.12).

London.

Entre Nous.

The Inward Vision.

It is a pleasant task to pass on the word that so great an authority as Miss Evelyn Underhill has found a new book worthy to be included in her very brief list of 'Modern Guides to the Spiritual Life.' This is not very new now—it was published last autumn—but is well worth getting and pondering. It is *The Inward Vision*, by R. H. J. Steuart, S.J. (Longmans; 5s.). Father Steuart has an original point of view and a very hopeful one; hope streams over the book like light. He is not always easy. Thus, we will quote a characteristic passage from the paper entitled 'The Mystery of His Will':

'The performance of His Will on my part consists essentially in my sincere *desire* to perform it, and that however conveniently (and so, within the bounds of my nature, on that account quite truly) I represent this will as some definite practical vocation which I must do my utmost to follow, I must yet always bear in mind that that vocation, as I represent it, is in itself no more than a formula. . . .

'I shall be strongly armed against the discouragement and the shadow of despair which dog the path of the idealist if I never allow myself to forget that the *substance* of my hopes must of necessity remain hidden from me till God has made the whole complete.

'God's will is done in me when my will is with constancy bent to His, whatever it may be; when all that I want—or want to want—is what He wants. For in God's eyes my success is not that in the end I have done what I tried to do, but that up to the end I have tried to do it.'

We commend to our readers also the meditation on the Power of God which contains this—he is speaking of the Presence of God every day all our lives long:

'I, who am self-forming, may build in this shape or in that; the pressure, always the same, adapts itself to each—the same law, the same light, the same love—not compelling my assent, indeed, yet following me with undiminished instance upon my furthest wanderings and moulding itself into my worst sins, pressing even these into the service of my sanctification.

'This it is which has given to many, on looking back over their past lives, a strange—almost uneasy—awareness of some hidden Power, which, in spite of all their consciousness of free election, has

seemed somehow to have been leading or driving them, without their knowledge, and has in the end made unison and harmony out of so much wilful incoherence and discord—suffering that has somehow come now to be understood as happiness, failure that is seen now to have been fulfilment, evil that has turned into good.'

We turned from this stimulating book to study a list of the other modern spiritual guides which we had, by the kindness of Miss Underhill herself, written down in a letter. Among them she would put Baron von Hügel's 'Letters' and 'Life of Prayer'; Maritain's 'Prayer and Intelligence'; Grandmaison's 'Personal Religion'; Dome Berse's 'Works on Mental Prayer'; Huvelin's 'Amour de Notre Seigneur' and 'Echoes'; and Dr. Benson's 'Spiritual Letters.' We shall all have our own list; but it is good to know hers. By the way, the reading of a quite new biography shows that that gallant young soldier Billy Congreve always carried in his coat a copy of 'The Practice of the Presence of God.'

C. MILES.

Shere.

Mark Guy Pearse.

The biography which has just been published by The Epworth Press of *Mark Guy Pearse, Preacher, Author, Artist* (3s. 6d. net), is a short one, but the reading of it repays one. It has been written by his daughter, Mrs. George Unwin, in collaboration with Mr. John Telford, B.A.

Mark Guy Pearse was born of Cornish parents in 1842. His people were amongst the first Wesleyan Methodists in Cornwall. One of his earliest memories is of how a dear old Cornish saint, 'Old Rosie,' would put her hands on his head and pray, 'God bless the little lad; bless him, Lord, and please, Lord, to make him a preacher, for Jesus Christ's sake.' He felt, he says later, that Rosie's words laid a spell on him that he could not break, for after a year or two as a medical student he gave it up and entered Didsbury College. He was ordained in 1869, while he was in the Bedford Circuit. From Bedford he went to London, then for a short time to a quiet country place, Launceston, and then Bristol. By this time he had decided he could do his best work if he were free to give most of his time to writing, and when asked to join Hugh Price Hughes in a mission in the West End of London he hesitated. Mrs. Hughes has described the interview that took

place. 'For two hours,' she said, 'my husband talked without stopping, setting forth his ideas and plans. Mr. Pearse never uttered one word. Can you imagine him silent for two hours? "Well, will you come?" asked Mr. Hughes at length. "Yes, I will," said Mark Guy Pearse, and with that he bolted, and so rapidly that Mr. Hughes had not even time to ask him for his London address.' As Mrs. Unwin says, it was a momentous decision. Mark Guy Pearse's part was to preach every Sunday morning and every Friday, and to assist in any other way he chose, but he was to be free from the cares of organization. From the beginning Mark Guy Pearse had been a pioneer in the Methodist pulpit. 'He set his face against contentment with a personal salvation. The key-note of his message was: "God save us from the selfishness of our salvation! 'He who saves his soul shall lose it' is a tremendous truth. The only way to save our souls is to give ourselves away in love. This is the truth we want declared with the deepest conviction and the greatest force we can put into it. The religion that fails to save a man out of selfishness into love will never save a man out of hell into heaven." . . . "Mark Guy Pearse's religion," wrote one, "is that which makes husbands come home early to tea and to their waiting families; which makes working-men give the lion's share of their wages to the wife; which makes everybody tender to little children, compassionate to prodigals, lovingly ministrant to the aged, the sick, and the dying." He had great gifts and he made use of them all in his preaching. There was his power of imagination. With his Celtic temperament truth came to him by flashes of insight rather than by reasoning and research, and there was a vein of mysticism in his nature. In 'Daniel Quorm,' he says, 'An' mind not to forget the windows. Be sure o' that. Every sermon ought to be builded like the Lord told Noah to build the ark—a window shalt thou make in the ark. Put in a story or one o' the blessed Master's likes, and it'll be a window for to let the light in through.' He could not be dull himself, nor did he easily suffer dullness in others, and one day, the biography says, as he sat on the platform beside Mrs. Hughes, listening to a learned but somewhat lengthy divine 'proving' Christianity, he whispered, 'If he goes on another five minutes I shall become an atheist!'

Towards the end of his life he sent Mr. Telford a private letter in which he described his methods. 'It has been laid upon my mind, in looking over my long ministerial life, that whatever success may have attended it I ascribe mostly to the fact that

I could never get a room big enough to hold the prayer-meeting. From a vestry where I found half a dozen I had a schoolroom with 250. I made that the "Big Wheel of the Church." I am writing this privately, because I should not like to publish what seems like proclaiming my self-importance. But to you I may say that the success of the prayer-meeting lay first in the fact that I always took it myself and could work out my own methods: that is *essential*. But, much more than that, I always prepared myself by an hour of quiet communion, and went with "the fire in my hand," as Abraham went up the mount. And in that hour of communion I generally got a little message for the prayer-meeting—often a message that I found later was exactly adapted to some condition or circumstance of somebody present. I got the principal men in the Church to come, and I told them they must take part, and they came. The most wonderful week was that in which I asked for slips from those who desired prayer for unconverted relatives or friends—of course, without names. The next week was our praise-meeting, when slips were sent up for special answers to prayer. I do not think it ever happened without having sometimes wonderful—it ought not to be wonderful—cases of conversion. . . . As I write I recall the days at Clifton and Portland, and elsewhere, when I have seen many sitting outside the schoolroom door, unable to get in, and remember how people came sometimes a distance because they heard that folks got converted there.'

The most popular of his books has always been 'Daniel Quorm and his Religious Notions,' but he himself liked 'Praise' best. Many of the last generation were nourished on his books—books in which religious truth is presented so attractively, with so much imagination and pictorial power and so much humour and kindliness. A number of his collections are still to be had from the Epworth Press—'Daniel Quorm,' 'Good Will,' 'Cornish Stories,' 'Short Talks for the Times,' 'Christ's Cure for Care,' 'A Village down West,' 'The Ship where Christ was Captain,' and his last book, 'He must Reign.'

After he gave up public service his pen was busy. In everything he saw the love of God, and he had a firm belief that the world was getting better. He held it was a sin to take gloomy views. 'Whatsoever things are lovely . . . think on these things' was one of his prescriptions, and to the very end his sense of humour never failed. On one of his last days as he lay apparently asleep on the sofa he opened his eyes and said to his son, "The

partridges will be saying their prayers to-day," and shut them again. We thought he was dreaming for a minute, until some one said, "Of course, it's the first of September to-morrow!"

Total Abstinence.

'In 1882, when speaking at a big temperance meeting at the Colston Hall, Bristol, he [Mark Guy Pearse] said: "It took me nearly twenty years to see my way to thorough out-and-out total abstinence, and I am but three years old as an abstainer. . . . If circumstances can hedge the moderate drinker about with safety, if the amount one takes, and the place and the company in which it is taken determine the rightness or wrongness of moderate drinking, then I claim that no conditions can be found more favourable to utter and complete harmlessness than those in which I have moved. Now, what has been my experience? Bit by bit I have been driven in, by the sheer force of terrible and appalling facts, from my position to total abstinence as the *only* right and safe standpoint for any Christian man."

'He went on to describe the steps by which he came to make this decision. The first was the discovery—illustrated by stories—that total abstinence was a capital thing *for the working class*. Later, he found terrible havoc wrought by drink in a beautiful home where he had many times sat at the table taking wine, and lending the sanction of his position as a minister of Christ. It was too late to undo this harm, and, much perturbed in spirit, he resolved never to take anything except in his own house. The occasion that at last led him to sign the pledge may be told in his own words.

"I had gone to the house of a troublesome teetotaler, who had that day buried his only son. . . . 'I do wish you'd join us,' he had said earnestly. I shook my head, and congratulated myself on my good company in Cana of Galilee. I went home, but that night I could not sleep. My thoughts and heart went out to this father in his grief. I said half aloud, 'I would do anything to comfort him'; at once it occurred to me, 'Sign the pledge and join him in temperance work; that would comfort him.' 'But why should I give up so much for him?' I asked myself. Then came words spoken, I thought, and still think, by the Master Himself. 'Thou talkest of My company at Cana of Galilee. What did I give up to comfort thee?' And once again I saw, not Cana, but Calvary. There hung my Lord in His great grief and agony

and dreadful shame. For me He had laid down His life! Should I dare any more to quote His example? Yes, indeed I could, but for quite another purpose. 'We ought to lay down our lives for the brethren.' I sought my Lord's forgiveness for my blind selfishness."¹

Matthew xv. 26.

'Mr. Pearse kept his eyes and ears open everywhere. When he was in Greece he said to the Greek pilot, who understood English perfectly, "How many words have you in Greek for *dog*?" "Two," said the man. "There is the word meaning the nasty wild dog in the street, who is a pest and a devil"; and his face expressed the disgust he felt. "But the other word"—and his tone and countenance changed pleasantly—"is for the *little* dog that every one loves, that is like one of the family." He found in this an illustration for the story of the Canaanitish woman. To her Jesus used a word found nowhere else in the Bible—*lap-dogs*—"It is not meet to take away the bread from the children, and to give it to the little dogs." Instantly her eyes flashed triumphantly. She felt that the case was won. "Of course not, Lord, because the little dogs pick up the crumbs that fall from their master's table."²

'My Father made them all.'

'I remember, as long ago as I can remember anything, hearing Dr. Burns Thomson, of the Cowgate Mission, opening a flower-show in his native town and mine. And I see and hear him at this moment as he waves his hands over the stacks of flowers, and says: "My Father made them all." And I never to this day see a summer-garden, or a flower-show, or a bouquet of beautiful flowers, that I do not hear a voice in my heart saying often, "My Father made them all." Such Divine wisdom is there in a word of faith and love fitly spoken in the open ear of a little child.'³

¹ Mrs. George Unwin, *Mark Guy Pearse*, 59.

² *Ibid.*, 103.

³ A. Whyte, *The Nature of Angels*, 206.